The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

672.  The JIC Assessment was discussed at the AHMGI on 16 December, where the

consequences of slow ISF development on MNF drawdown were reiterated.610 Ministers

agreed that a number of papers should be prepared, including practical suggestions to

adjust the Petraeus Plan, ways of improving the IMOD and MOI, a list of security and

funding issues for Mr Blair to raise with President Bush and a list of useful activities that

other countries could be asked to undertake.

673.  In a Note to President Bush on 10 January 2005, Mr Blair described the Iraqiisation

of security forces as critical but said that he was not convinced that the plan to deliver

it was robust enough.611 He identified work on ISF leadership – both Ministerial and

operational – as necessary as well as the provision of “the equipment they need to be

a match for the insurgents”. Mr Blair suggested that the objective should be “more and

tougher quality, while building quantity” and confirmed that he had authorised “an extra

$78m from our MOD for the Iraqi Forces in the South”. Although he could not be sure

that funding was essential, Mr Blair wrote “I’ll take the risk rather than find six months

later it was”.

674.  When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference the following day, he

suggested that the “Luck Review” (described later in this Section) would “give us a better

idea of what was required on Iraqiisation”.612

675.  On 16 January, Mr Phillipson sent a note to Mr Geoffrey Adams, Mr Straw’s

Principal Private Secretary, with details of Mr Sheinwald’s visit to Washington a couple of

days earlier.613 When he met Dr Rice, Mr Sheinwald raised the “gloomy assessment” that

“only a few thousand of Iraqi Security Forces personnel were properly trained and led”.

676.  Mr Sheinwald said: “This showed the scale of the problem, as the official numbers

for those trained and equipped was 120,000.” Dr Rice was recorded as saying that “the

problem with the police was simple. They were trained to walk a beat but were now

facing terrorists with RPGs [Rocket Propelled Grenades]. They were either fleeing or

dying, but not fighting.”

677.  On 21 January, Mr Phillipson wrote to Mr Chris Baker, Principal Private Secretary

to Mr Hoon, with a summary of a meeting held between Mr Blair and Mr Hoon that

morning.614 Gen Walker, Ms Aldred, Mr Phillipson and Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s

Chief of Staff, were also present. Mr Blair “said that his primary concern remained that

the Iraqiisation programme was not working”. Gen Walker “conceded that it certainly was

not happening as fast as we had hoped” and that “all of Gen Petraeus’ timelines had

been missed”. He said that there remained a “crucial need to accelerate the Iraqiisation

programme to advance the date when ISF could take over security”.

610  Minutes, 16 December 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.

611  Letter Sheinwald to Hadley, 10 January 2005, [untitled] attaching Prime Minister to President Bush,

10 January 2005, ‘Note’.

612  Letter Quarrey to Owen, 11 January 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 11 January’.

613  Letter Phillipson to Adams, 16 January 2005, ‘Nigel Sheinwald’s Visit to Washington: Iraq’.

614  Minute Phillipson to Baker, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Future Strategy’.

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