6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
94.
On 23 January,
Mr Drummond allocated responsibility for following up the
five
issues on
which the participants in the Washington talks had agreed the need
for further
co-ordination:
•
The role of
the UN. The NSC would lead for the US; Mr Stephen Pattison,
Head
of FCO
United Nations Department (UND), for the UK.
•
Economic
issues. State Department to lead for the US; FCO Economic
Advisers
for the
UK.
•
Humanitarian
issues. DFID was already working with the NSC and USAID
and
would
continue to co-ordinate with the FCO, MOD and others.
•
War crimes.
The US appeared to favour a two-tier approach, with the
Iraqi
legal
system trying those suspected of war crimes against the Iraqi
people and
a different
system for war crimes against Coalition Forces, though this
was
not agreed
policy. US and UK lawyers and policy-makers on both sides
would
discuss,
with the FCO in the lead for the UK.
•
Rights of
the Occupying Power. FCO and MOD legal advisers would pursue
with
US legal
advisers.
95.
Mr Drummond
added that Brigadier William Rollo, MOD Director of
Military
Operations,
would take forward post-conflict military planning through the
British
Embassy
Washington and links into CENTCOM.
96.
Mr Drummond
emphasised that the work was urgent. The UK “should take
the
initiative
in arranging the work of the groups” and individual leads should
report progress
to the
Cabinet Office by 7 February.
97.
The first
meeting of UK members of the UN group was held on 31 January and
the
first
meeting of the economic group on 3 February.53
98.
UK members of
both groups travelled to Washington in the week of 3 to 7
February
for
inter-agency discussions.
99.
UK military
planners were encouraged by the level of detail in US Phase
IV
plans
presented at the CENTCOM planning conference on 23 and 24 January,
but
expressed
concern about:
•
whether the
level of ambition in US planning would be matched by
political
will and
resources;
•
the
underlying assumption that the plan could be implemented
without
international
support or interference;
53
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 3 February 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
327