7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
185.
Mr Straw
also stated that a majority of members of the Security Council had
been
opposed to
the suggestion that resolution 1441 should state explicitly that
military action
could be
taken only if there were a second resolution.
186.
Mr Blair
was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military
planners were
looking at
12 March as the possible start date for the military campaign;
and that
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, was concerned about the apparent
disconnect
with
activity in the UN.84
187.
Baroness Amos,
Minister of State, Department for International
Development
(DfID),
advised on 4 March that Angola, Cameroon and Guinea were not
yet ready
to commit
to a “yes vote” and had emphasised the need for P5
unity.85
188.
Sir
Christopher Hum, British Ambassador to China, advised on
4 March that,
if the resolution
was put to a vote that day, China would abstain.86
189.
Sir John
Holmes, British Ambassador to France, advised on 4 March that
France’s
main aim
was to “avoid being put on the spot” by influencing the undecided,
preventing
the US and
UK mustering nine votes, and keeping alongside the Russians and
Chinese;
and that
there was “nothing that we can now do to dissuade them from this
course”.87
Sir John
also advised that “nothing the French say at this stage, even
privately, should
be taken
at face value”.
190.
Mr Igor
Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told Mr Straw on
4 March that Russia
had failed
in an attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to leave and it would veto
a
resolution
based on the draft circulated on 24 February.88
191.
France,
Germany and Russia stated on 5 March that they would not let a
resolution
pass that
authorised the use of force.89
Russia and
France, “as Permanent Members of
the
Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this
point”.
192.
The British
Embassy Washington reported overnight on 5/6 March that
“barring
a highly
improbable volte face by Saddam”, the US was now firmly on track
for military
action and
would deal firmly with any efforts in the UN to slow down the
timetable.90
193.
The Embassy
reported that the only event which might significantly affect the
US
timetable
would be problems for the UK. That had been described as “huge –
like trying
84
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Timing of Military
Action’.
85
Minute Amos
to Foreign Secretary, 4 March 2003, [untitled].
86
Telegram 90
Beijing to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Lobbying the
Chinese’.
87
Telegram
110 Paris to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Avoiding a
French Veto’.
88
Telegram 37
FCO London to Moscow, 3 [sic] March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meetings with
Russian
Foreign Minister, 4 March’.
89
The
Guardian,
5 March 2003, UN war
doubters unite against resolution. The Guardian,
6 March 2003,
Full text of
Joint declaration.
90
Telegram
294 Washington to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: UN
Endgame’.
595