The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
memorandum
“simply created the message that Saddam wanted to hear; that
the
international
community was divided”.
738.
In a letter to
Sir David Manning on 25 February, Mr Straw’s Private Office
identified
the core
arguments for the UK to use in persuading other members of the
Security
Council to
support the resolution as:
“•
There is an
objective case against Iraq. We have given inspections 12
years
already.
SCR 1441 (2002) set clear benchmarks – immediate,
unconditional
and active
co-operation. Iraqi co-operation has not been
forthcoming.
•
More time
will make no difference. Inspections are not a detective
agency.
How many
last chances can you have?
•
The
authority of the UN is at stake. Collective threats in a globalised
world
means
taking on threats where they emerge …
•
It is in
no-one’s interest to see the US go unilateral. We need to show
the
US that
the UN can play a constructive role.”219
739.
Following
their discussion of the next steps on 25 February, Sir David
reported that
Dr Rice
thought there would be no vetoes of the resolution.220
740.
President
Chirac’s position was identified as important but Mr Blair
decided
to wait for
“the right moment” to resume their dialogue.
741.
Sir John
Holmes wrote to Sir David Manning on 24 February offering advice
on
the way
ahead.221
He
recommended that it remained important that Mr Blair
continued
to talk to
President Chirac, “even if there is at present no chance of
changing his mind”.
There would
be “the usual problems about who picks up the phone first” but it
would
be “much
easier to attempt any final persuasion if we have kept up a
dialogue”.
742.
Recognising
that it was “outside my province, and very much for” Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock,
Sir John also wrote:
“… the
assumption here is that the French will not have to veto if we
cannot
assemble
nine positive votes … But have we thought about going ahead with
a
vote even
if we know we cannot get nine positive votes? Might there not be
value
in a vote
with six or seven positive votes and everyone else abstaining – it
would
be a
diplomatic failure in one sense, but if no-one had voted against,
perhaps more
of a
political mandate than otherwise? There might of course still be
the risk of a
French vote
against, but would they really want to do it in these
circumstances? It is
obviously
too soon to know how all this will play out in the end, but it
might be worth
keeping the
thought in mind.”
219
Minute Owen
to Manning, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Resolution: Positions
of E10’.
220
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
221
Letter
Holmes to Manning, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: France’.
310