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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
memorandum “simply created the message that Saddam wanted to hear; that the
international community was divided”.
738.  In a letter to Sir David Manning on 25 February, Mr Straw’s Private Office identified
the core arguments for the UK to use in persuading other members of the Security
Council to support the resolution as:
There is an objective case against Iraq. We have given inspections 12 years
already. SCR 1441 (2002) set clear benchmarks – immediate, unconditional
and active co-operation. Iraqi co-operation has not been forthcoming.
More time will make no difference. Inspections are not a detective agency.
How many last chances can you have?
The authority of the UN is at stake. Collective threats in a globalised world
means taking on threats where they emerge …
It is in no-one’s interest to see the US go unilateral. We need to show the
US that the UN can play a constructive role.”219
739.  Following their discussion of the next steps on 25 February, Sir David reported that
Dr Rice thought there would be no vetoes of the resolution.220
740.  President Chirac’s position was identified as important but Mr Blair decided
to wait for “the right moment” to resume their dialogue.
741.  Sir John Holmes wrote to Sir David Manning on 24 February offering advice on
the way ahead.221 He recommended that it remained important that Mr Blair continued
to talk to President Chirac, “even if there is at present no chance of changing his mind”.
There would be “the usual problems about who picks up the phone first” but it would
be “much easier to attempt any final persuasion if we have kept up a dialogue”.
742.  Recognising that it was “outside my province, and very much for” Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, Sir John also wrote:
“… the assumption here is that the French will not have to veto if we cannot
assemble nine positive votes … But have we thought about going ahead with a
vote even if we know we cannot get nine positive votes? Might there not be value
in a vote with six or seven positive votes and everyone else abstaining – it would
be a diplomatic failure in one sense, but if no-one had voted against, perhaps more
of a political mandate than otherwise? There might of course still be the risk of a
French vote against, but would they really want to do it in these circumstances? It is
obviously too soon to know how all this will play out in the end, but it might be worth
keeping the thought in mind.”
219  Minute Owen to Manning, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Resolution: Positions of E10’.
220  Letter Manning to McDonald, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
221  Letter Holmes to Manning, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: France’.
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