3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
788.
A letter from
Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir David Manning on 17 March
confirmed
that the
military plan took full account of the risks and problems
identified by the JIC
Note of 13
March, ‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’.282
789.
The MOD’s
objectives and plans for the military campaign, and the
JIC’s
assessments
of Iraq’s capabilities and intent, and are addressed in Sections
6.2 and 8.
790.
In response to
a request from Sir David Manning, Mr Scarlett provided advice
on
“the
strength of evidence showing Saddam’s possession of
WMD”.283
791.
In relation to
Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capability,
Mr Scarlett
concluded
that the JIC view was clear: Iraq possessed chemical and biological
weapons,
the means
to deliver them, and the capacity to produce them.
792.
Mr Scarlett
attributed the failure to find any significant evidence of chemical
and
biological
weapons to Iraq’s ability to conceal its activities and deceive the
inspectors.
793.
Mr Scarlett’s
advice is addressed in more detail in Section 4.3.
794.
A draft of the
document held by the MOD, also dated 17 March 2003,
shows
Sir David
Omand, Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary and Security and
Intelligence
Co-ordinator,
Sir Richard Dearlove, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS),
Sir Francis
Richards, Director, Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ)
and senior
officials in the MOD, the FCO and the Cabinet Office as copy
recipients.284
795.
The Government
was unable to find any evidence that the final version
of
Mr Scarlett’s
minute to Sir David Manning was sent to anyone outside
No.10.285
796.
A specially
convened Cabinet at 1600 on 17 March 2003 endorsed the
decision to
give Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to leave Iraq and to ask
the
House of
Commons to endorse the use of military action against Iraq to
enforce
compliance,
if necessary.
797.
Mr Blair
told his colleagues that he had called the Cabinet because “an
impasse”
had been
reached at the UN.286
282
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘JIC Paper: ‘Saddam’s Plan for
Baghdad’.
283
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Evidence of
Possession’.
284
Minute
[unsigned draft] Scarlett to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD:
Evidence of Possession’.
285
Letter
Cabinet Office to Iraq Inquiry, 19 March 2014,
‘Declassification’.
286
Cabinet
Conclusions, 17 March 2003.
539