3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
would allow
other Member States to argue that it did not amount to an
authorisation of
the use of
force. He concluded:
“In the
time available I have not been able to consult the Attorney
General, whose
views would
be crucial. In the past his predecessors have emphasised the need
for
a
clear
statement that the Council authorises the revival of the use of
force, which
this draft
does not appear to offer. We will need to obtain the Attorney’s
view on the
effect of
any language once it firms up.”130
375.
The British
Embassy Washington reported on 4 October that Vice
President
Cheney
wanted a resolution that would provide a ‘tripwire’ for military
action.
376.
Mr Brenton
reported on 4 October that he had been told that Vice
President
Cheney
“simply didn’t believe that any achievable inspection regime would
give us
the cast
iron assurance we had to have that Iraqi WMD had been eliminated.”
He
“[supported]
the … US approach” of trying to get the UN to endorse a tough
inspections
regime; but
he expected “Saddam would try to play games” and “would be caught
out,
providing
the US with its casus belli”.131
Vice
President Cheney would not “sign up to any
regime
which seemed likely to fail in this tripwire
function”.
378.
President
Bush set out the case for urgent action to disarm Iraq
on
7 October.
379.
President
Bush stated that Iraq had “an opportunity to avoid conflict”
only
if it
complied with all its obligations. The US hoped it would make that
choice
but it
had “little reason to expect it”.
380.
On 1 October,
in advance of the votes in Congress to authorise the use of
force,
if it
proved necessary to enforce Security Council demands, the Central
Intelligence
Agency
produced its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ‘Iraq’s
Continuing Programs
for Weapons
of Mass Destruction’.133
381.
An
unclassified document based on the NIE was published on 4 October
(see
130
Minute
Grainger to Ricketts, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Draft Resolution:
OP10’.
131
Minute
Brenton to HMA [Washington], 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Cheney’s
Attitude’.
132
Manuscript
comment Powell on Minute Brenton to HMA [Washington], 4 October
2002, ‘Iraq:
Cheney’s Attitude’.
133
CIA, 1
October 2002, National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass
Destruction.
134
CIA, 4
October 2002, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.
265