4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
699.
The Butler
Report stated:
“… there
was throughout this period a substantial volume of intelligence
reports
on Iraqi
deceptions and concealment activities, coupled with – as
UNMOVIC
reported –
a lack of active co-operation with the inspectors. There were
also
the UNMOVIC
discoveries … Even so, we are surprised that neither
policy-
makers nor
the intelligence community … conducted a formal re-evaluation
of
the quality
of the intelligence and hence of the assessments made on it.
We
have noted
in departmental papers expressions of concern about the impact
on
public and
international opinion of the lack of strong evidence of Iraqi
violation
of its
disarmament obligations. But those involved seem to have operated
on
the
presumption that the intelligence was right, and that it was
because of the
combination
of Iraqi concealment and deception activities and perceived
UNMOVIC
weaknesses
that such evidence was not found.”288
700.
In his minute
of 11 February issuing guidance on the use of intelligence
in
CIC
products, Sir David Omand pointed out that “the reputation of the
intelligence
community”
was “at risk” whenever intelligence material and judgements were
“attributed
701.
The reputation
of the Government was equally at risk whenever it used
material
from the
intelligence community as evidence in support of its
policy.
702.
The JIC’s
judgement from August 2002 until 19 March 2003 remained
that
Iraq might
use chemical and biological weapons in response to a military
attack.
703.
Despite the
lack of firm intelligence about Iraqi plans, the JIC continued to
judge
that Iraq
might use chemical and biological weapons. The JIC did not,
however, address
the tension
between that judgement and its judgement that Saddam Hussein’s
primary
objective
was the survival of his regime.
704.
In addition,
although the quantity of chemical and biological weapons and
material
which was
unaccounted for, or could have been produced, since 1998 was
significant,
it was much
less than Iraq had possessed in 1991 and would have been of limited
utility
on the
battlefield against the Coalition, as the evidence on military
planning set out in
Sections
6.1 to 6.3 demonstrates.
705.
Iraq’s ability
to use chemical or biological weapons to pose a threat to
countries
in the
region would have depended on having an effective means of
delivery, which
was questionable.
288
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
362.
289
Minute
Omand to Campbell, 11 February 2003, ‘The Use of Intelligence in
CIC Products’.
415