The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

571. Lord Goldsmith continued:

“That is not to say that action may not be taken to remove Saddam Hussein from

power if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate

measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the

objective of military action. This should be borne in mind in considering the list

of military targets and in making public statements about any campaign.”

572. Mr Hoon wrote to Lord Goldsmith on 10 March forwarding two papers:

• one on targeting considerations (addressed later in this Section); and

• a second, ‘Disarming Iraq’, written to underpin “the choice of military tasks

in the Government’s draft campaign objectives”.187

573. On 11 March, Ministers discussed legal issues, including holding back for

a few days the response to a US request for the use of UK bases, and the viability

of the military plan.

574. Mr Blair held a meeting on 11 March with Mr Prescott, Mr Hoon, Lord Goldsmith

and Adm Boyce.188 Mr Straw attended part of the meeting. Sir Andrew Turnbull,

Mr Powell, Mr Alastair Campbell (Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy),

Baroness Morgan (Mr Blair’s Director of Political and Government Relations),

Sir David Manning and Mr Rycroft were also present .

575. Mr Blair was advised beforehand that the main purpose of the meeting was to

confirm viability of the overall military plan.189 Suggested questions for Mr Blair to raise

included:

• Did the US have a winning concept?

• Did he agree with Mr Hoon that: specialist roles should be secured for the UK;

the UK area should be extended northwards; and options should be explored

for reinforcing US forces?

• What conditions should UK forces expect in Basra?

• How would the US “reorganise” if UK forces were not involved?

576. Mr Bowen advised Sir David Manning that the US request for the use of UK

bases was to be discussed at Mr Blair’s meeting with Lord Goldsmith, Mr Straw and

Mr Hoon on 11 March.190 He understood that Mr Straw and Mr Hoon had copies of

Lord Goldsmith’s advice.

577. As Section 5 makes clear, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Dr John Reid, Minister without

Portfolio and Labour Party Chair, and the Chiefs of Staff had all seen Lord Goldsmith’s

187 Letter Hoon to Goldsmith, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Targeting Policy’ attaching Paper ‘Disarming Iraq’.

188 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal and Military Aspects’.

189 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq Military: 1300 Meeting’.

190 Minute Bowen to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘US Use of British Bases’.

476