8 | The invasion

Information operations were an integral part of the military plan. They were to be

“employed to create doubt and disaffection against the regime, aggressively undermining

its legitimacy”.24

In its first account and analysis of the operation, published in July 2003, the MOD

described the information campaign as:

“… designed to influence the will of the Iraqi regime and the attitudes of ordinary

Iraqi people in support of overall campaign objectives. It also articulated the [UK]

Government’s strategy to our allies and partners, and others in the region and

elsewhere who were either non-aligned or opposed to Coalition policy on Iraq.

This multi-level approach, in conjunction with the US and other allies, required an

integrated, agile campaign based on open reporting and transparency. Most effort

was devoted to opinion forming media, including terrestrial television, the press,

satellite and cable bearers, Internet and interactive media and ultimately bulk

leaflet drops over Iraq itself.” 25

In a subsequent report on lessons from the conflict, the MOD stated that media

infrastructure within Iraq was only targeted if there was “sufficient evidence that it was

being used by the Iraqi regime for command and control purposes”.26

One element of the information operations campaign was intended to “seek to persuade

Iraqi military units not to fight”.27

Adm Boyce told the Inquiry that:

“… part of the battle plan was that we got messages … to Iraqi formations that if

they did certain things and looked [in] the other direction, we would walk past them,

because … we saw – the importance of actually maintaining the Iraqi Army as

being the infrastructure to maintain sensible good order once the country had been

defeated and indeed also keeping professionals, such as people who subsequently

we have not been able to use who were Ba’athists, given the fact that everybody

had to be a Ba’athist to be a professional; you had to be a card-carrying member.

And also not trashing the joint, if I can use that expression.” 28

Mr Geoff Hoon, Defence Secretary from 1999 to 2005, told the Inquiry that:

“… planning for what was described by the Americans as effects-based warfare

was very successful … quite quickly, large numbers of Iraqi soldiers … simply

went home.” 29

39. In Phase III of the plan, Gen Franks’ objective was to reach Baghdad as soon

as possible, bypassing Iraqi forces if necessary, to secure the acquiescence of the

24 Letter Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military Plan’.

25 Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, July 2003.

26 Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December 2003.

27 Minute Reith to COSSEC, 11 March 2003, ‘Phase 4A – A UK Response’.

28 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, page 99.

29 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, page 111.

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