3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
417.
In the context
of a discussion about the attitudes of other members of the
Security
Council,
Sir David Manning suggested that US and European opinion
should be
reminded of
what had happened over Kosovo:
“We had
tried to go the UN route; we were thwarted; so we had had to resort
to a
coalition
of the willing. The moral was that we would prefer to take action
through the
UN if we
could but we would find other means if we could not.”
418.
Mr Blair
stated that in those circumstances, the US and UK would have to
make
clear that
either the UN accepted its responsibilities for enforcing its
decisions, or action
would be
taken without it. It was “critically important” that the initial
resolution should
not appear
to be “merely a pretext for military action”; we had to make it
clear that
we remained
committed to the resumption of inspections and wanted the
resolution
to succeed.
419.
President Bush
and Mr Blair also discussed the prospects for a military
campaign,
including
the possibility of leaving Saddam “bottled up” in
Baghdad.
420.
Sir David
Manning recorded that Mr Blair had expressed caution about the
US
assumption
that the UK would be ready to lead a strike from Turkey into
northern Iraq
and provide
two-thirds of the force. But Mr Blair emphasised that the UK
would indeed
take “a
significant military role” if it came to war with
Iraq.
421.
Finally, the
importance of US action to make progress on the MEPP was
also
discussed.
422.
Sir David
Manning’s record of the discussion was submitted to Mr Blair
and sent to
a number of
colleagues in No.10. A personal copy was also sent to
Mr Straw. No other
copies
appear to have been made.
423.
US and UK
officials held a meeting in parallel with the discussions
between
President
Bush and Mr Blair. The only record of that meeting appears in
Mr Campbell’s
diary, in
which he wrote that they had addressed three issues:
•
building
the case on the evidence for why Saddam had to be dealt with
now;
•
why Saddam
posed a unique threat; and
•
the need
for the US to engage on the Middle East.131
424.
A plenary
meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair and their teams
followed
the
restricted discussion.132
425.
Presentational
issues were discussed between officials and in the
plenary,
including
the “Why now?” question.
131
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
132
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 8 September 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Bush, Camp David
7 September:
Public Presentation of Iraq Policy’.
165