The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
outside its
current area of operations”.120
He
confirmed that a request for UK ground
forces to
be made available to relieve US forces was under consideration and
that a
recommendation
from Gen Walker was expected by the middle of the
week.
“This
request, if agreed, would involve UK land forces operating outside
MND(SE).
It is worth
bearing in mind that Royal Air Force personnel have been
operating
over the
whole of Iraq when required to support the coalition, and that some
British
personnel
are based in Baghdad to support coalition operations. Other British
land
forces have
previously operated outside MND(SE).”
239.
Denying
speculation that the request was “somehow political” and linked to
the
US Presidential
Elections, Mr Hoon stressed that it had been “a military
request …
linked to
… efforts to create the best possible situation in which to hold
the Iraqi
elections
in January”.
240.
In a press
conference the following day, Mr Straw was asked whether
the
deployment
was a “done deal” and replied that the UK was “very sympathetic” to
the
US request,
but “no final decision has been taken”.121
241.
Mr Straw told
journalists:
“I
understand the concerns that have been expressed. I think the
concern is as to
whether or
not there is so-called mission creep, whether we will be there
longer
than anticipated.
“We are not
proposing to increase the total number of troops that would be in
Iraq,
nor would
we be extending the normal tour of duty of this particular unit
[the Black
Watch].
“The
purpose of these military movements is to stabilise the security
situation
as quickly
as possible so that we create a more satisfactory security
environment
more
quickly so that, in turn, the elections can take place by the end
of January so
that in
turn the Iraqis can start more quickly to take more and effective
control of
their
country.”
242.
On 19 October,
Lt Gen Fry provided a paper for the Chiefs of Staff outlining
the
background
to the request and the necessary timeline for any decision on
deployment.122
He did not
make any recommendation as to whether or not the UK should agree to
the
US
request.
120
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18
October 2004, columns 625-626.
121
ITN, 19
October 2004, UK: Annan,
Straw Speak to Press After Talks on Darfur and Iraq.
122
Minute
DCDS(C) to COS (via COSSEC), 19 October 2004, ‘Iraq – Potential UK
Battlegroup
Deployment
to North Babil’.
434