1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
the Iraqi
counterpart should facilitate the production by Iraq of a document
that
will
provide further assurance that the technically coherent picture of
Iraq’s
clandestine
nuclear programme is comprehensive.”
•
It had not
been possible to verify Iraq’s statement in relation to a
specific
instance of
external assistance offered to its clandestine nuclear programme,
or
its
statements regarding the “government committee” or of the actions
attributed
to Lt Gen
Kamil.
•
The IAEA
had “no information that contradicts Iraq’s statement that it
had
never
identified nuclear weapon design options beyond those
preliminary
concepts
described in its report”, but ongoing monitoring would be based
on
the
assumption that Iraq retained “the technical capability to exploit,
for nuclear
weapons
purposes, any relevant material to which it might gain
access”.
•
The IAEA
intended to implement an aerial radiation survey in Iraq, based
on
Iraqi
co‑operation with the use of fixed-wing aircraft.
440.
On
22 January, Mr Butler sent a report of his recent visit
to Iraq to the President
of the
Security Council.174
441.
During his
visit, Iraq had proposed a three-month moratorium on any attempt
by
UNSCOM to
visit Presidential and sensitive sites, pending completion of
initial technical
evaluation
meetings.
442.
Iraq also
rejected a request to allow the Commission’s fixed-wing aircraft
to
exercise
their right to use airbases throughout Iraq. Mr Butler
wrote:
“I must
remind the Security Council that full access is required not only
for
disarmament
purposes but also in the context of ongoing monitoring and
verification.
Access
relinquished now could be needed in important ways in the
future.”
Sir
Christopher Meyer, British Ambassador to the US from 1997 to 2003,
drew the
Inquiry’s
attention to a speech made by Mr Blair in January 1998 in
which he said:
“We have a
clear responsibility in the interests of long term peace in the
world to stop
Saddam
Hussein from defying the judgement of the world’s community. He
must
be either
persuaded by diplomacy or made by force to yield up his long
cherished
ambition to
develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; weapons
which
threaten
not only his immediate neighbours in the Middle East, but pose a
direct and
fundamental
challenge to world peace.
174
UN Security
Council, 22 January 1998, ‘Report of the visit to Baghdad from
19 January to 21 January
1998 by the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the
Security Council under
paragraph 9
(b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1998/58).
103