1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
–
Development
of metallurgical technologies necessary for the fabrication
of
the uranium
components of a nuclear weapon.
–
Research
and development activities related to the production of plutonium
…
–
Development
of nuclear weapon designs and weaponisation technologies
for
implosion
devices and the establishment of industrial-scale facilities for
their
further
development and production.
–
Research
and development activities related to the integration of a
nuclear
weapon
system with a missile delivery system.” 141
341.
Dr Blix added
that the IAEA’s ability to understand the details of the
programme
had been
“severely hampered by Iraq’s persistence in a policy of concealment
and
understatement
of the programme’s scope and achievements”.
342.
The report
included a summary of Iraq’s actions since 1991 and the
IAEA’s
activities
illustrating that point. Since May 1997, the IAEA had “received
clarification
of many
matters”, although it had:
•
“not
provided a comprehensive statement of the membership, terms of
reference
and
duration of authority of the Governmental Committee charged,
inter
alia,
to
‘reduce the
effect of NPT violation to the minimum’”;
•
“stated
that it has no further information regarding external assistance to
its
clandestine
nuclear programme”;
•
“declared
itself unable to describe the motives behind the actions ascribed
to
the late Lt
Gen Hussein Kamil which resulted in the concealment of the cache
of
documentation,
material and equipment ‘discovered’ at the Haider House
farm”;
•
“declined
to include, in its FFCD a summary of the practical and
theoretical
achievements
of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme”; and
•
“yet to
provide the promised written description of its post-war
procurement
system”.
343.
Despite those
issues, the IAEA report stated that:
•
There were
“no indications to suggest Iraq was successful in its attempts
to
produce
nuclear weapons”, although there was “no documentation or
other
evidence”
which showed “the actual status of the weapon design when
the
programme
was interrupted”.
•
Iraq was
“at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as
the
production
of HEU [Highly Enriched Uranium] through the EMIS process,
the
production
and pilot … of … gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of
the
explosive
package for a nuclear weapon”.
141
UN Security
Council, 8 October 1997, ‘Fourth consolidated report of the
Director General of the
International
Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council
resolution 1051 (1996)’
(S/1997/779).
85