The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
480.
Although
Mr Chakrabarti did not attend the meeting on 18 February, by
then
he should
have been aware:
•
of the
possibility that the UN would not lead the
post-invasion
reconstruction
effort;
•
that the US
might fail to produce a satisfactory post-conflict plan;
and
•
that the UK
military required effective DFID support if the UK was to
meet
its likely
obligations in Iraq.
481.
In those
circumstances, as Permanent Secretary, Mr Chakrabarti
should
have:
•
ensured
that DFID officials had:
{{analysed
the risks associated with DFID’s plans for a limited
contribution
to the UK’s humanitarian and reconstruction effort in
post-conflict
Iraq;
{{assessed
the need for contingency preparations for a much
broader
role in
humanitarian relief and reconstruction; and
•
shared the
findings with Ms Short.
482.
There is no
indication that Mr Chakrabarti engaged on the issue
with
Ms Short,
DFID officials or the military, either before the meeting on 18
February
or in the
weeks remaining before the invasion.
483.
During
February, UK officials became increasingly concerned about the
risk
that the UK
might agree to take responsibility for a geographical sector of
Iraq
before the
implications of doing so had been examined.
484.
A draft IPU
paper on “sectorisation”, not yet agreed with the MOD,
recommended
that the UK should make clear to the US that it was unwilling
to
take
responsibility for a sector for more than 60 days unless its
presence was
authorised
by the UN and there was to be an early move to a UN
transitional
administration.
485.
IPU
guidance for UK officials attending the US inter-agency Rock Drill
on
post-conflict
issues on 21and 22 February stated that, in the very short term,
the
UK would
have to administer a small area, most likely around Basra, where
its
troops were
present at the end of hostilities.
486.
The UK
would not make a commitment to administer a division-sized
area
in the
medium to long term.
487.
On 14
February, Mr Ehrman reported to Mr Ricketts that at a
“[Sir David] Manning
meeting” on
post-conflict issues, Sir David had “expressed strong concern that
junior
394