The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of the
city”. This would help to legitimise the Iraqi authorities and
remove much of the
motivation
for the current Sadrist attacks.
102.
Maj Gen Shaw
reported that he had commissioned a piece of work from
the
Southern
Iraq Steering Group on what the South might look like after the MNF
left.
The
conclusions were, in his view, optimistic for the long term; “the
macro drivers are
positive,
but the micro issues will be messy in resolution”. He sent a copy
to MNC-I and
MNF-I
headquarters and to the Permanent Joint Headquarters as a
contribution to what
Maj Gen
Shaw hoped would be a piece of JIC work on the same subject, to
enable
political
judgements to be taken on the basis of a fully informed
assessment.
103.
On 15 July, Lt
Gen Lamb reported that Gen Mohan and Maj Gen Jalil’s focus
on
Basra had
brought a degree of “much needed clarity to the
situation”.44
He
suspected
that a
recent IED attack on Maj Gen Jalil had been the work of an
Iranian-backed JAM
Special
Group, “wishing to stop what they see as an unwelcome interference
in their
affairs
down in Basra”.
104.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted, at their meeting on 17 July, that “it was clear
from
discussion
at the MCNS that Iraqi priorities would lie in establishing
security for
Baghdad and
Diyala; security to enable PIC for Basra would need to compete
with
these higher
priorities”.45
105.
On 17 July,
the Iraq Policy Unit sent a minute to Mr Miliband, in
preparation for the
NSID(OD)
meeting on 19 July.46
It said
that there were arguments for sticking with the
plan to
hand over in August:
“Chiefs of
Staff are clear that the cost in casualties of maintaining a
presence at the
Palace far
outweighs the operational effect. The troop reductions … are also
needed
in order to
ensure the sustainability of our deployments in
Afghanistan.”
106.
However,
because of the difficulties in intervening within the city of Basra
from the
Air
Station, the IPU recognised that:
“…
reposturing from the Palace would represent de
facto PIC. The
prospect of
this taking
place several months ahead of de
jure PIC is
uncomfortable. We would
continue to
be formally responsible for security, while in reality having very
little
control.”
107.
Although the
US Administration was likely to be “nervous” about the prospect
of
the UK
leaving Basra Palace, and the consequent reduction in troops, the
FCO’s view
was that
such concerns “should be manageable”. The FCO was more concerned
at
“the
potential divergence in US and UK thinking on PIC, and on our
military planning
44
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 15 July 2007, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (261) 15 July
07’.
45
Minutes, 17
July 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
46
Minute
Lever to Private Secretary [FCO], 17 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Ministerial
Meeting, 19 July’.
204