The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
number of
minor changes to the former, the most important of which was to
correct a
statement
that Iraq had, in 1991, been “within 1-2 years” of acquiring a
nuclear weapon.
Consistent
with the paper on Iraqi WMD programmes, that was replaced by the
words
“within
less than three years”.
511.
A detailed
list of occasions on which UN inspectors had been harassed or
denied
access to
sites was removed.
512.
Mr McKane
told the Inquiry that the role of the CIC was “to sharpen up the
product
… to make
the language clearer, to make it language that would be more
readily
understood
by the public”.222
513.
Mr Miller
reported to Mr McKane on 7 June that there was “no serious
difference
of analysis
or interpretation” between the US and UK on WMD.223
He also
reported that
work had
been commissioned on a US paper for publication on Iraqi
WMD.
514.
The paper on
Iraq produced for the Chiefs of Staff “Strategic Think Tank”
on
18 June,
stated:
“Although
Iraq’s nuclear capability (essentially a ‘dirty’ bomb) cannot be
dismissed,
the main
threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons.”224
515.
In a minute to
Mr Miller on 17 June, a junior official in the Assessments
Staff
confirmed
that the CIC had attempted “to reformat the Iraqi WMD section of
the
Government
briefing paper to match other sections”, but “Apart from removing
the word
‘evidence’
from the summary, they have not altered the text”.225
516.
The draft
Iraq dossier was sent to Sir David Manning on 21 June, with
advice
that
Ministerial guidance would be needed on the content of the paper
and the
timing of
publication.
517.
Following a
meeting on 19 June, Mr McKane sent the latest versions of
the
three “Iraq
public documents” and a draft Foreword to Sir David Manning,
stating that
Ministerial
guidance was needed on:
•
“Whether
Ministers are content with the texts …”
•
“Whether to
invite the International Development Secretary to sign
the
Foreword
alongside the Foreign and Defence Secretaries.”
•
“Timing of
publication.”
•
“Whether to
treat three Iraqi public documents as a package or
separate
out the Iraq
WMD paper.”
222
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 76.
223
Minute
Miller to McKane, 7 June 2002, ‘Iraq WMD: Public
Documents’.
224
Minute
MA1/DCDS(C) to PSO/CDS and others, 13 June 2002, ‘Supporting Paper
for COS Strategic
Think Tank
on Iraq – 18 Jun’ attaching Paper.
225
Minute
Assessments Staff [junior official] to Miller, 17 June 2002,
‘Releasable Dossiers on WMD’.
104