The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

162. On 24 February, the UK, US and Spain tabled a draft resolution stating that Iraq

had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 and that the Security

Council had decided to remain seized of the matter.67 The draft failed to attract support.

163. France, Germany and Russia responded by tabling a memorandum, building on

their tripartite declaration of 10 February, stating that “full and effective disarmament”

remained “the imperative objective of the international community”.68 That “should be

achieved peacefully through the inspection regime”. The “conditions for using force”

had “not been fulfilled”. The Security Council “must step up its efforts to give a real

chance to the peaceful settlement of the crisis”.

164. On 25 February, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the intelligence was

“clear” that Saddam Hussein continued “to believe that his weapons of mass destruction

programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression”.69 It was

also “essential to his regional power”. “Prior to the inspectors coming back in”, Saddam

Hussein “was engaged in a systematic exercise in concealment of those weapons”.

The inspectors had reported some co-operation on process, but had “denied progress

on substance”.

165. The House of Commons was asked on 26 February to reaffirm its endorsement of

resolution 1441, support the Government’s continuing efforts to disarm Iraq, and to call

upon Iraq to recognise that this was its final opportunity to comply with its obligations.70

166. The Government motion was approved by 434 votes to 124; 199 MPs voted for

an amendment which invited the House to “find the case for military action against Iraq

as yet unproven”.71

167. In a speech on 26 February, President Bush stated that the safety of the American

people depended on ending the direct and growing threat from Iraq.72

168. President Bush also set out his hopes for the future of Iraq.

169. Reporting discussions in New York on 26 February, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote

that there was “a general antipathy to having now to take decisions on this issue, and

a wariness about what our underlying motives are behind the resolution”.73 Sir Jeremy

concluded that the US was focused on preserving its room for manoeuvre while he was

67 Telegram 302 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Tabling of US/UK/Spanish

Draft Resolution: Draft Resolution’.

68 UN Security Council, 24 February 2003, ‘Letter dated 24 February 2003 from the Permanent

Representatives of France, Germany and the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the

President of the Security Council’ (S/2003/214).

69 House of Commons, Official Report, 25 February 2003, columns 123-126.

70 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 February 2003, column 265.

71 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 February 2003, columns 367-371.

72 The White House, 26 February 2003, President discusses the future of Iraq.

73 Telegram 314 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 26 February’.

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