4.4 | The
search for WMD
408.
On
16 July, Mr Howard reported that the ISG was now focusing
its effort
on
debriefings and document exploitation, but that it was still “very
much at the
beginning”
of its task.
409.
Mr Howard
visited the ISG in Baghdad and Qatar in the second week of
July.211
He reported
to Mr Scarlett that:
“A lot of
emphasis is being placed on human intelligence and interviews
and
debriefings
both of high value detainees and low ranking individuals. Another
main
area of
effort, which is beginning to produce some results, is document and
other
media
exploitation. Major centres for this have been set up both in
Baghdad and
in Qatar
which bring together subject matter experts, linguists and, in the
case
of Baghdad,
some powerful IT tools to sift what is a vast quantity of material
for
interesting
information and leads.
“… But, it
is still true to say that we are very much at the beginning of the
task and
the ISG has
only really reached its current state of effectiveness in the last
fortnight.”
410.
Mr Howard
provided a copy of the ISG’s four “Operating
Hypotheses”:
“•
Iraq had an
active WMD development program separate and apart from
WMD
production
•
Iraq hid
CW/BW weapons and agents, delivery systems, and WMD
program
information
within Iraq away from sites known to the Coalition, or outside
Iraq
•
Iraq
destroyed existing stockpiles (but likely retained a mobilization
or production
capability
that could produce CW/BW agents and delivery systems)
•
If Iraq
destroyed its stockpile (or most of it), it would have taken place
at remote
locations
or areas with no previous link to the WMD program.”
411.
Mr Howard
advised that, with the exception of evidence of Iraqi attempts to
extend
the range
of anti-ship cruise missiles to 180km, there needed to be “a good
deal more
exploitation
and investigation before a rounded picture in any of the key areas
can be
pulled
together”.
412.
Mr Howard
reported that Dr Kay wanted to avoid “drip-feeding” material to
London
or
Washington for fear of leaks and of raising expectations
unjustifiably. Dr Kay was
also very
wary of making anything public in the near future, but was “pretty
bullish” that
he would
have “a reasonably convincing BW package for use in public by early
to mid
September”.
He would understand if the UK wanted to publicise the missile
programme
before
then, but believed it would have more impact combined with
something on BW or
CW in
September. Mr Howard agreed.
211
Minute
Howard to Scarlett, 16 July 2003, ‘Iraq WMD’ attaching Paper
[unattributed], [undated], ‘ISG
Operating
Hypotheses’.
505