The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
434.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told the Inquiry that:
“… by and
large, the American political assessment of what was going on in
Iraq
was more
positive than our own. In conversations with Bush and in
conversations
with other
people … by and large the impression was not that things were
going
well, but
they didn’t have the same sense of foreboding and concern which
was
evident in
London from the summer of 2003.”253
435.
On 7 October,
PJHQ reported a “major public order disturbance” in
Basra,
at
the site where former Iraqi army conscripts were paid their
stipend.254
It
was
thought
to be the result of rumours that there was not enough money to
pay all those
who were eligible.
436.
The protesters
burned the records required to make the payments. PJHQ
reported
that “Iraqi
police were present but were unable to control the incident and
dispersed”.
437.
During the
incident, UK troops shot dead an Iraqi man. He was thought at the
time
to be a
protestor, but later identified as an armed security officer in
plain clothes.255
438.
On 8 October,
a final version of the UK Iraq Strategy was issued to members of
the
AHMGIR by
Cabinet Office after “those Private Offices who responded indicated
their
Ministers’
endorsement”.256
439.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald annotated his copy: “I don’t see a need for PM to see
this.”
440.
The Strategy
acknowledged the CPA Strategy published in July 2003 and
stated
that this
was a longer-term UK Strategy for Iraq that was broadly consistent
with it, but
which set
the framework for specific UK activities towards a common
objective.
441.
The Strategy
identified the UK objective as:
“Iraq to
become a stable, united and law-abiding state, within its present
borders,
co-operating
with the international community, no longer posing a threat to
its
neighbours
or to international security, abiding by all its international
obligations and
providing
effective representative government, sustainable economic growth
and
rising
living standards to all its people.”
442.
The Strategy
defined a Stabilisation Phase up to December 2003, for
which
the
objective was that Iraq should be restored to pre-conflict levels
of development
and
order.
443.
During 2004
there would be a Recovery Phase, during which the CPA would
pass
all its
powers to a sovereign, representative Iraqi
Government.
253
Private
hearing, 3 September 2010, page 15.
254
Minute
PJHQ-J9-POLOPS8 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 October 2003,
‘Op.TELIC: Unrest in
Basrah and
Death of Iraqi National’.
255
Telegram 33
Basra to FCO London, 9 October 2003, ‘South Iraq: The Political
Scene’.
256
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 8 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy’.
280