4.4 | The search for WMD

being pursued by the ISG. Two options were under consideration: sanitising the draft for

public release, or producing a three- to five-page executive summary.

744. Mr Rycroft commented to Mr Blair that Mr Duelfer’s suggested approach was

“worrying”, and that Mr Scarlett and Sir Nigel Sheinwald would be pursuing the issue

with the US.413

745. On 22 March, Mr Scarlett told Sir Nigel Sheinwald that the ISG had reported the

previous day that Mr Duelfer had decided that the sanitised version of the full report

would need to remove all the paragraphs on the direction of future investigation, as

well as the items that were policy and source sensitive.414 As a result, he had directed

that work should focus on a short summary, which was “broadbrush” and gave “little

supporting detail”.

746. Mr Scarlett added that the points which stood out were:

• “a focus on the use of illicit funds for procurement” although there was “a big

gap between the funds raised (several billion dollars) and those allocated to the

Military and Intelligence Commission ($500m)”;

• “no CBW weapons found nor any agent production facilities”;

• “unresolved questions over research into CBW agents and planned chemical

agent production, but little detail given”;

• “items on the high speed rail gun and explosive test facilities which have

possible nuclear weapons implications”;

• “little new information in the section on delivery systems”.

747. Mr Scarlett “wondered” whether the change in Mr Duelfer’s position reflected

“advice from Washington”, but he had “no evidence”, and it might well have been

“generated within the ISG on operational grounds”.

748. Mr Scarlett wrote that he had “made it clear” to Mr Duelfer and to the CIA in

Washington “that the clear preference for policy makers in London is for publication

of a sanitised version of the full report”.

749. On instruction from Mr Blair, Sir Nigel Sheinwald raised UK concerns about the

drafting of the report with Dr Rice on 22 March.415 Sir Nigel told Dr Rice that:

“Duelfer now seemed to have decided against publishing any of the report itself,

and had circulated a five page summary in the form of his intended Congressional

testimony. This was in fact similar to the technique used last October by David Kay,

which had not worked at the time. But Kay’s unclassified summary was a good deal

more detailed than Duelfer’s draft. We seemed to be going backwards.”

413 Manuscript comment Rycroft on Minute Scarlett to Sheinwald, 18 March 2004, ‘ISG’.

414 Minute Scarlett to Sheinwald, 22 March 2004, ‘ISG Interim Report’.

415 Letter Sheinwald to Adams, 22 March 2004, ‘Conversation with US National Security Adviser’.

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