The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1223.
Lt Gen Reith
produced an update on Phase IV planning for the Chiefs of
Staff
on 21
March.523
He warned
that Phase IV delivery remained subject to “uncertain
US dynamics
at the pol/mil [politico-military] level”. US planning continued,
but was
“primarily
bottom-up”, and CFLCC was still seeking guidance on key issues
including
governance,
payment of salaries and “regeneration” of the
military.
1224.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that there were already signs that previous
assumptions
about the
nature and duration of the conflict might have been wrong. Phase
IV(a)
now looked
likely to be far shorter than previously expected, while the
arrival of other
Coalition
partners and NGOs looked like taking longer. All this added
pressure. The
paper
listed a number of issues needing resolution, pointing out that
some were already
well known.
They included: the system of governance under Phase IV(b); how
to
approach
SSR; provision of salaries to Iraqis; and how to engage with the
Iraqi military
and
judiciary.
1225.
On “military
realities”, Lt Gen Reith stated that: “The Coalition must be
prepared
for
high/medium/low consent and variations thereof in time and space,
including
asymmetric
attack and intra-factional violence.” “How to deal with
non-compliance” was
listed as
one of the “key issues requiring resolution”.
1226.
In a second
paper, Lt Gen Reith updated the Chiefs of Staff on
humanitarian
assistance.524
USAID had
led the development of the CMOC/DART structure to
provide
immediate
relief as Coalition forces advanced. UK forces would draw primarily
on the
US DART,
but had developed national contingency plans in case demand
outstripped
supply,
including funding for QIPs and DFID-funded medical
supplies.
1227.
On 24
March, Treasury officials advised Mr Brown that:
•
The Chiefs
of Staff considered a medium scale deployment of
10,000-
15,000 to
be the most the UK could sustain in the medium term
without
lasting
damage to the UK’s forces.
•
It was
unlikely, except in the most benign post-conflict scenario, that
the
maximum
envisaged UK force would be able to deal with all the
challenges
on its
own.
•
No
significant Coalition partners were likely to come forward without
an
appropriate
UN resolution.
•
Treasury
and MOD views differed on the wisdom of taking on a
two-star
command
without “the necessary guarantees”.
523
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 21 March 2003, ‘Phase IV Planning – Taking
Stock’.
524
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 21 March 2003, ‘Humanitarian Assistance for
Iraq’.
528