The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
387.
Reflecting on
the results, Mr Patey commented:
“On the
plus side, this result demonstrates overwhelming Iraqi popular
support for
the draft
Constitution and opens the way to the election of a permanent,
four-year
government
… The process was well-run and robust enough to strongly
resist
any allegations
that fraud or other kinds of irregularities materially affected
the
overall
result.
“On the
negative side, the vote was highly polarised, with almost all Shia
and Kurds
voting in
favour and almost all Sunni Arabs voting against. We should not
forget
that small
numbers of all three major communities voted against the
mainstream,
including
in those areas where they would have been under fierce social
pressure to
vote the
other way (e.g. Anbar). The Shia turnout overall was significantly
down on
the January
elections and we must assume that, in addition to apathy, at least
some
of those
who stayed away did so because they did not support the
Constitution.
We continue
to warn Shia and Kurds against the dangers of
triumphalism,
and are
urging them to temper their response, [and] acknowledge
publicly
Sunni
dissatisfaction …
“We will
continue to work closely with the US to encourage maximum
Sunni
participation
in the elections, including through intensive political engagement
with
the Sunnis
themselves …”172
388.
Mr Straw
reported to Cabinet on the outcome of the referendum on 27
October.173
He
commented that the decisions of key Sunni parties to support the
constitutional
process was
a step forward, but most Sunnis had voted against the
Constitution.
389.
Security
incidents on election day had been “only a third of the level
on
30 January”.
The next milestone was the election on 15 December, meanwhile the
UK
was
“working hard” with the US and others to “provide support to Iraqi
politicians in
developing
the democratic process, building alliances and considering
coalitions for
government”.
Mr Asquith
told the Inquiry that the Constitution did not command the support
of the Sunni
Arab
community, principally because they had boycotted the January 2005
elections, and
to a large
extent had therefore written themselves out of the political
programme thereafter
until the
next set of elections.174
172
eGram
16570/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 26 October 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution Passes: Final
Referendum
Results’.
173
Cabinet
Conclusions, 27 October 2005.
174
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, page 13.
554