The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

441.  After November 2008, it might be possible to move to “strategic overwatch”, with

re-intervention capacity based elsewhere in Iraq and in Kuwait. Mr McDonald and

Mr Hadley agreed that “it was now important for our senior military personnel to discuss

the relative merits of the plans”.

442.  Once Mr McDonald had returned to the UK he briefed Mr Brown on the discussion.

When Mr Brown and President Bush spoke by video conference on 28 September,

the President said he had also been briefed on the meeting and was comfortable

with UK plans.

443.  Basra “took top billing” again at the 30 September MCNS meeting.213 With the

exception of Dr Safa al-Safi (the Acting Minister of Justice), the Committee agreed that

Gen Mohan had performed well in bringing Basra under control and that his tenure

should be extended.

444.  Mr Prentice commented that the “general tone of Iraqi debate on Basra seems to

be improving. General Petraeus was especially supportive.”

October 2007

445.  Government officials working closely with the military met JAM1 on the morning of

1 October.214 In order to mitigate his personal risk, JAM1 asked for future negotiations

to be conducted through his lawyer. Under pressure from senior Sadrists, JAM1 also

stressed the importance of his interlocutors having broader contacts with JAM, to protect

the agreement that had been reached if anything should happen to him.

446.  One of the officials commented:

“Seen from here, these latest developments emphasise the need for a rapid

broadening of political engagement with the Sadrists in Basra.”

447.  On 1 October, at the request of the FCO and the MOD, the JIC examined the

prospects for political stability in Basra and the threat to UK forces up to spring 2008.215

448.  The Assessment included graphs showing the recent reduction in attacks on MNF

bases in Basra, from a high of 226 attacks in July to nine in September.

449.  The JIC’s Key Judgements were:

“I. No single political party dominates politics in Basra. Politicians use their positions

primarily to pursue personal power and wealth. Most are supported by Shia militias

213  eGram 40408/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 2 October 2007, ‘Iraq: Ministerial Committee for National

Security, 30 September’.

214  Email government official working closely with the military, 2 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:

1 October Meeting with [JAM1]’.

215  JIC Assessment, 1 October 2007, ‘Politics and Violence in Basra: Prospects’.

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