9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
365.
In his Note,
Mr Blair proposed doubling the number of Iraqi police and
speeding
up the
process of letting reconstruction contracts. In the South, he wrote
that he had
“authorised”
the CPA to “just spend the money and recoup later from
CPA(Centre)”.
366.
Mr Blair
confirmed that an increase in the numbers of British troops would
be
announced
in the following days. He expressed support for Ambassador Bremer,
and
queried
whether he had all the administrative and technical support he
needed.
367.
On the
developing resolution, Mr Blair wrote “I wouldn’t bet on too
much help
coming
forward … I suspect that unless we sort security, help will be hard
to find”.
“So my
basic point is: the problem is not complex to identify: it is
security. The best
solution is
not us or at least us alone but the Iraqis. It is speed in building
their
capacity –
security, intelligence, infrastructure, media – that we
need.”
369.
Mr Cannon
reported the video conference between Mr Blair and President
Bush to
Mr Straw’s
Private Office on 5 September.217
The
conversation had followed Mr Blair’s
Note
closely.
370.
Dr Rice and
Sir Nigel had been asked to draw up a list of concrete measures
that
could be
taken to improve the situation.
371.
Sir Nigel and
Dr Rice spoke later on 5 September and agreed that their
report
should
cover:
•
security;
•
infrastructure
– including the UK specifying problems with financial flows
from
the centre
of the CPA;
•
the media;
and
•
personnel –
including a more precise set of requirements for the CPA
in
Baghdad and
in CPA (South).218
372.
Mr Hoon
informed Parliament on 8 September that there would be an
increased
deployment
of UK troops to Iraq.219
His
statement said:
“While the
full scale of the requirement, which will be largely driven by
initiatives of
the
Coalition Provisional Authority and the Department for
International Development
(DFID) to
accelerate reconstruction activities across Iraq, has yet to be
fully
developed,
there is an immediate requirement for two battalions and some
additional
specialist
personnel, vehicles and equipment to allow him [the UK
Divisional
217
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
video-conference with Bush,
5 September’.
218
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 5 September 2003, ‘Conversation with Condi
Rice: 5 September: Iraq’.
219
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 8
September 2003, columns 2-3WS.
269