6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
co-operation
with the military. CMOC and DART recruitment was under way. The
US
was
co-ordinating closely with the UN and NGOs, had funded the UN High
Commission
for
Refugees (UNHCR) to pre-position emergency assistance and expected
the World
Food
Programme (WFP) to be a significant partner in the delivery of
food.
19.
The Embassy
also reported that US officials had envisaged that the
post-conflict
talks in
Washington on 22 January would focus on emergency relief and
reconstruction,
before
accepting a UK and Australian suggestion that they also address
future political
20.
The record of
a restricted meeting of the cross-Whitehall Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq
(AHGI) on
14 January stated that the UK and Australia were being given full
access
to US
aftermath planning.7
The MOD had
established a team at the Permanent Joint
Headquarters
(PJHQ) to examine aftermath issues. Relevant departments would
be
involved in
the team’s planning and the MOD would pass papers to the Cabinet
Office
for wider
distribution. The record stated, however, that “without a higher
level political
and legal
framework, MOD planning cannot advance very far”.
21.
On 14
January Mr Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, announced
publicly
that the UN
had begun humanitarian contingency planning for Iraq.
22.
In response to
a question at a press conference on 14 January about
the
humanitarian
consequences of war, Mr Annan stated:
“We have
been doing some contingency planning on that and we are
extremely
worried
about the fallout and consequences of any such military action.
Obviously
we do not
want to be caught unprepared. So we have gone ahead and
made
contingency
plans, and we are in touch with governments that can provide
some
financial
assistance for us to move our preparations to the next level. But
we are
23.
On 22
January, Mr Straw approved the briefing prepared for the
UK delegation
to the
US/UK/Australia inter-agency talks in Washington.
24.
The
briefing material focused on unresolved differences between the UK
and
US on the
wider post-conflict role of the UN.
25.
It
envisaged the Coalition military handing over to an interim,
civilian
administration
operating under UN auspices, “as soon as practically
possible”.
6
Telegram 44
Washington to FCO London, 13 January 2003, ‘US/IRAQ: Day After
Humanitarian Planning’.
7
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq’.
8
UN News
Centre, 14 January 2003, Secretary-General’s
press conference.
311