Executive
Summary
not then
directly making the assessment upon it. That is one of the very
important
strengths
of our system compared with most other systems around the
world.”281
847.
The FAC
endorsed those sentiments.282
It stated that
the JIC has a “vital role
in
safeguarding the independence and impartiality of intelligence”;
and that the
“independence
and impartiality of its own role” was “of the utmost
importance”.
It recommended
that Ministers should “bear in mind at all times the importance
of
ensuring
that the JIC is free of all political pressure”.
848.
In its
response to the FAC, the Government stated:
“We agree.
The JIC plays a crucial role in providing the Government with
objective
assessments
on a range of issues of importance to national
interests.”283
849.
The military
plan for the invasion of Iraq depended for success on a
rapid
advance on
Baghdad, including convincing the Iraqi population of the
Coalition’s
determination
to remove the regime.
850.
By the end of
March, the Government had recognised the need for
sustained
communication
of key strategic messages and improved capabilities to reach a
range
of audiences
in the UK, Iraq and the wider international community. But there
was clearly
a need for
more robust arrangements to integrate Coalition efforts in the UK,
US and the
forces
deployed in Iraq.
851.
The reaction
of the media and the Iraqi population to perceived
difficulties
encountered
within days of the start of an operation, which was planned to last
up to
125 days,
might have been anticipated if there had been more rigorous
examination
of possible
scenarios pre‑conflict and the media had better understood the
original
concept of
operations and the nature of the Coalition responses to the
situations they
encountered
once the campaign began.
852.
The difficulty
and complexity of successfully delivering distinct strategic
messages
to each of
the audiences a government needs to reach should not be
underestimated.
For any
future military operations, arrangements tailored to meet the
circumstances
of each
operation need to be put in place in both London and on the ground
before
operations
begin.
281
Ninth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002‑2003, 7
July 2003, The
Decision to go
to War in
Iraq, HC 813‑1,
paragraph 153.
282
Ninth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002‑2003, 7
July 2003, The
Decision to go
to War in
Iraq, HC 813‑1,
paragraphs 156‑157.
283
Foreign
Secretary, November 2003, The
Decision to go to War in Iraq Response of the Secretary
of
State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, November 2003,
Cm6062, paragraph 27.
133