The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
levels and,
in particular, equipment”. Prime Minister Maliki had said that “the
ISF were
outgunned”,
citing an example in Najaf where he had been told by the Chief of
Police
that his
13,000 officers “had only 5,000 rifles between them”.
1057.
Following his
visit, Mr Blair wrote to President Bush stating that ISF
build‑up
“must be
improved”.973
He
continued:
“… the
basic point is: we need better, stronger ISF build‑up. A strong
centre will be a
big help.
But they also need equipment and intensive support. Therefore we
need to
do this
even better and more strongly and test the robustness of the
build‑up. Iraqi
MOI and MOD
need real capability to make it happen. If we don’t do this, we
can’t
defeat the
terrorists.”
1058.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald wrote to Mr Hayes on 23 May reporting
Mr Blair’s conclusions
as a result
of his visit.974
On SSR,
Mr Blair wanted action including:
“•
Drawing up
a timetable with conditions setting out the potential path to
MNF
withdrawal.
This should address the desire of Iraqis for clarity over
two
issues:
that the MNF will stay until Iraqi security forces are capable of
acting
independently;
and that the MNF will go once that has been achieved.
Any
timetable
should include dates, but each one should be conditional on
ISF
build‑up of
capability and overall violence levels …
•
We need to
make sure that Iraqi forces really are capable of dealing with
the
threat,
including from AQ … The Prime Minister heard a number of
disquieting
comments on
this score from Iraqis and others. We therefore need a
candid
analysis of
the gap between current capabilities and future requirements …
and
a plan for
closing the gap …
•
…
•
Turning
around the situation in Basra … This will require … a larger role
and
presence
for the Iraqi forces, working alongside UK forces … The Prime
Minister
hopes that
the Defence Secretary will personally supervise the military
aspects
of
this.
•
…
•
Capacity‑building
for Iraqi Ministries. We need a paper setting out our and
the
US’s
current assistance to them, in terms both of advisers and
equipment, and
a plan
for addressing additional gaps.”
1059.
DOP(I) met on
25 May.975
Mr Blair
said that the UK should focus on the
development
of the ISF, seeing progress in Basra, and support to the Iraqi
Government
973
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 22 May 2006, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note Prime
Minister to President Bush.
974
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 23 May 2006, ‘Iraq’.
975
Minutes, 25
May 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
296