10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
The
apparent overspend against DFID’s 2005/06 budget was caused by the
FCO charge
for life
support costs.
DFID’s
expenditure on infrastructure projects peaked in 2005/06. Of the
£45m spent on
non-life
support costs in 2005/06, £35m – over 75 percent – was spent on
infrastructure.127
In
comparison, DFID spent £15m on infrastructure in 2004/05 and £14m
in 2006/07.
210.
In February,
Ministers agreed UK priorities for 2005, including
“reviewing
reconstruction
to find ways to make a difference quickly”.
211.
On 21 January,
No.10 commissioned the Cabinet Office to produce a paper
on
Iraqiisation,
the UK’s military options and a game plan for engaging the US, to
support
a discussion
on UK strategy after the Iraqi elections.128
212.
The 28 January
meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group (ISG) discussed a draft of
that
paper.129
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald said that Mr Blair would also want the paper to
consider
“what could
be done to achieve quick and labour-creating results on
reconstruction
including
outside MND(SE)”.
213.
Sir Nigel
asked that the paper also consider the involvement of the
wider
international
community in military, police and civil administrative
capacity-building.
214.
The elections
to the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and
Provincial
Assemblies
took place across Iraq on 30 January 2005. The TNA did not convene
until
16 March,
after which negotiations to form the Iraqi Transitional Government
(ITG)
continued
into late April (see Section 9.3).
215.
On 1 February,
Mr Blair suggested to President Bush that they should focus
on
four areas
in order to exploit post-election momentum:
•
Iraqiisation;
•
political
outreach, including “whittling away at the opposition, so that the
hard
core were
left isolated”;
•
drawing in
the international community; and
•
reconstruction,
including areas in which there could be a quick impact
(eg power
generation).130
127
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 1 July 2011, ‘Iraq
Inquiry: request for further information
on
funding’.
128
Letter
Phillipson to Baker, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
129
Minute
Ferguson to Sheinwald, 1 February 2005, ‘Iraq Strategy Meeting – 28
January 2005’.
130
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 1 February 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 1 February’.
231