3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
•
“C said the
other risk was that we found the evidence of the breach before
the
US was
ready to go to war … if the inspectors had another month with
genuine
access, the
picture would be pretty clear. We were now pushing the line
that
they needed
time and space to do the job.”170
496.
Asked about
the comment that Mr Blair’s future was in his hands,
Sir Richard
Dearlove
told the Inquiry that he thought Mr Blair “was beginning to
understand that he
was in a
tough position vis‑a‑vis the inspection issue”.171
497.
In response to
a further question, Sir Richard stated:
“No, I
think when the Prime Minister says something like that – the one
thing
if you are
head of SIS is you have to be quite robust, and not be sort of put
off
by such
comments.
“I think
the problem for the Prime Minister at that point in time is it’s
much more
important
to him domestically that UNMOVIC has a success than it is to
the
US Administration.”
498.
A report of a
discussion between Adm Boyce and General Richard
Myers,
Chairman of
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the US could stay poised
for military
operations
for 3‑4 months.172
499.
Sir David
Manning wrote to Mr Powell that this was a “much better
timeline as far
as
inspections are concerned. Whether Bush will buy it is another
matter.”173
500.
When
Mr Straw and Secretary Powell spoke on 11 January, they
discussed
reporting
in both the UK and US, including a Washington
Post article
criticising Secretary
Powell for
trapping the US Government in the UN route and Mr Blair’s
comments that
27 January
was not a deadline which would be widely noted in
Washington.174
There
was a need
to synchronise the military planning and politics. It was
improbable that
the
inspectors’ reports to the Security Council on 27 January would
provide sufficient
evidence
for a second resolution, and the negotiation of such a resolution
would take
weeks.
501.
Mr Blair
sent a note to No.10 officials on 12 January.175
170
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
171
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 76‑77.
172
Minute
Zambellas to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 January 2003, ‘CDS
Telephone call to CJCS:
9 Jan
03’.
173
Manuscript
note Manning to Powell, on Minute Zambellas to PS/SofS [MOD], 10
January 2003,
‘CDS telephone
call to CJCS: 9 Jan 03’.
174
Letter
Straw to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 11 January’.
175
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 12 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
89