The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
625.
In its meeting
on 12 March, the JIC discussed a letter on the defence of
Baghdad
circulated
to members by Mr Julian Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, on
6 March.214
626.
In addition to
the points already covered, the JIC concluded that the
paper
“should
also say something about the possibility of CB use”.
627.
A JIC Note
issued on 13 March set out the JIC’s understanding of Iraqi
military
preparations
in Baghdad, and an initial view of their potential
effectiveness.215
It judged
that:
•
The Iraqi
regime expected the Regular Army only to delay any Coalition
attack
en-route to
Baghdad. It wanted to “drag out fighting and play for time,
hoping
that
international pressure will force the Coalition to halt its attack
and come to
a
negotiated settlement, leaving Saddam in power”.
•
Much of the
Republican Guard (RG), including Iraq’s best-equipped
military
units, was
based around Baghdad. That was roughly 35,000 of the RG’s
75,000
troops,
with 600 of Iraq’s best tanks and 900 other armoured vehicles.
Defensive
positions
had been prepared 15-25 km to the west and south of the city.
“Less
significant
preparations” had been made to the north and the east.
Those
defences
had “clear vulnerabilities” and were “not sufficient to stop a
Coalition
assault”.
•
Iraqi
security and militia organisations, backed by RG special forces
brigades,
were
responsible for the inner city. Together they “could muster at
least 10,000
men in
Baghdad, possibly many more”. There was “no evidence of a
systematic
fortification
of the city for use by large-scale conventional ground forces”
but
surviving
RG forces could retreat into Baghdad and “quickly prepare
ad-hoc
fall-back
positions. Even a few thousand lightly armed troops could
require
disproportionate
time and resources to overcome, with significant risk
of
Coalition
and civilian casualties.”
•
Iraq’s
plans for Baghdad depended on the “morale and cohesion of its
forces,
including
the ability of the authorities to continue exercising effective
command
and
control”. Intelligence “strongly” suggested that morale was already
low.
628.
The JIC did
not know whether Saddam Hussein would remain in
Baghdad.
Baghdad was
the best defended area and the best place for him to influence
events.
Saddam
Hussein was “very security-conscious”. Until there was “intense
fighting”
in Baghdad,
the JIC assessed that Saddam Hussein would be able to move
around
Baghdad
without detection.
214
Minutes, 12
March 2003, JIC meeting.
215
Note JIC,
13 March 2003, ‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’.
486