10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
735.
Also on 2
March, Dr Marsden and Maj Gen Shaw wrote to Ms Aldred, in
response
to Sir
Nigel Sheinwald’s 25 January request for a note on
civilian/military structures in
Basra.416
They
advised that:
“The
profile of the security concerns in southern Iraq should not
obscure the
fundamentally
political nature of the end state we are pursuing. Military action
must
be
supportive of the political and civilian lines of
operation.”
736.
Consistent
with that assessment, the SISG, chaired by Dr Marsden, would
oversee
delivery of
the strategic objectives identified in BBP3. The SISG would take
strategic
direction
from and report to the ISG and the ISOG in London.
737.
Maj Gen Shaw
told the Inquiry:
“… I had
inherited a situation where the military commander and the Consul
General
had joint
ownership of the southern Iraq Steering Group.
“Well, I’ve
always adhered to the principle that … if you can’t identify who is
in
charge, you
are in trouble, and joint ownership strikes me as a recipe for
disaster
because you
don’t know who is in charge.
“I said to
the Consul General [Dr Marsden], ‘Listen, this is a political
problem, not
a military
one now. We’re supporting you in achieving a political end state
for Iraq.
So you are
in charge, I’m in support. What do you want me to do?’
…” 417
738.
Dr Howells
briefed Ministers on the finalisation of BBP3 and the process
for
implementing
it at the 8 March meeting of DOP(I).418
BBP3 would
be circulated out of
committee
the following day for Ministers “to note”.
739.
The 8 March
meeting of DOP(I) also considered the deteriorating
humanitarian
situation
in Iraq.419
The
Government’s response to the humanitarian situation is
addressed
later in this Section.
740.
A DFID
official advised Mr Benn on 13 March that Mr Tinline (the
Deputy Consul
General)
would “double-hat” as the PRT Team Leader from 1
April.420
That should
ensure
better
co-ordination between civilian and military elements. PCRU
officials had covered
the post
since Mr Etherington’s departure in January.
741.
Mr Tinline
told the Inquiry that, during his time in Iraq, the British Embassy
Office
Basra had
an (international and local) staff of 100 and the PRT a staff of
30.421
416
Letter
Marsden and Shaw to Aldred, 2 March 2007, ‘The Comprehensive
Approach: Application
in southern
Iraq’.
417
Private
hearing, 21 June 2010, pages 20-21.
418
Minutes, 8
March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
419
Minutes, 8
March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
420
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 13 March 2007,
‘Iraq: Future of DFID’s
Presence
and Programme in Basra’.
421
Public
hearing, 24 June 2010, page 106.
315