14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
1023.
Given that
discussion, Gen Granville‑Chapman asked
Lt Gen Fulton to consider
what could
realistically be delivered “to address known and projected
shortfalls in the
timescales
we are talking about”.
1024.
Gen Granville‑Chapman
sent a copy of the DOC report to Mr Ingram on 21
April,
noting that
the Chiefs of Staff’s discussion of the report was based “almost
exclusively
around the
issue of re‑addressing our operational ISTAR
capabilities”.539
1025.
Gen Granville‑Chapman
wrote that it would have implications in both
Afghanistan
and Iraq
and that “resolution of this issue always came back to operational
priorities
within a
limited Departmental budget”. Despite that, ISTAR remained an
“enduring”
lesson that
had been raised in all three DOC reports.
1026.
On 10 May, Air
Commodore Nick Gordon, Director Directorate of
Equipment
Capability
(ISTAR), advised Gen Granville‑Chapman on the possibility of
using Predator B
to address
shortfalls in UK ISTAR capability.540
1027.
Air Cdre
Gordon stated that from “a standing start” it would take 24 months
before
a Predator
B could be fielded in theatre. In 2005, the DEC ISTAR team had
investigated
procuring a
demonstrator for trial in Afghanistan but, at a cost of around
£60m, it was
deemed
unaffordable within the available equipment funding. He also
advised that
“alternative
approaches” to procurement and platform operation could reduce cost
and
time
boundaries.
1028.
Lt Gen Houghton
produced his assessment of ISTAR shortfalls on operations
on
18
May.541
He
explained that FMV was “probably the most widely sought” ISR
capability
in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
1029.
For both
theatres, Lt Gen Houghton explained that the UK operated
within
a coalition
management process that afforded the UK “relatively low priority”
for the
allocation
of ISTAR assets. The agreement to provide MND(SE) with “12 hours
of
daily
Predator Feed” had been a “recurrent topic of bilateral discussion
over the past
few months”
but it was unlikely that there would be any significant change to
the UK’s
apportionment.
Any allocation of US Predator should be regarded as “a bonus”
and,
if the
UK concluded it was needed, it should aspire to acquire its
own.
1030.
Lt Gen Houghton
stated that MND(SE) had sought to offset the lack of
US
Predator
support by generating other FMV feeds. The FMV requirements were
satisfied
in part
with theatre‑level manned platforms but MND(SE) could not fully
exploit that
capability
due to a lack of ground terminals to download the
data.
539
Note VCDS
to MA/Min(AF), 21 April 2006, ‘DOC Operational Lessons Report –
Operation TELIC
Volume 3’.
540
Minute DEC
ISTAR to MA/VCDS, 10 May 2006, ‘Predator B’.
541
Minute CJO
to VCDS, 18 May 2006, ‘Quantifying ISTAR Shortfalls on Current
Operations’.
173