1.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001

84.  The paper identified the UK’s aims for Iraq and the Gulf Region and concluded

that a number of them were “unachievable” while Saddam Hussein’s regime remained

in power.

85.  The paper recommended that “Plan A” should be to persuade the US that full

implementation of resolution 1284 best served US/UK interests.

86.  If Iraq rejected that, the medium-term “Plan B” should be to restrict sanctions to

arms, persuade Iraq’s neighbours to enforce them more rigorously, end the Oil-for-Food

(OFF) programme in “Baghdad-controlled Iraq”, increase support to the Iraqi opposition,

impose a travel ban and assets freeze on Saddam Hussein and his regime, and pursue

the indictment of Saddam Hussein for war crimes. That would be presented as targeting

policy more directly at his regime.

87.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock called on Mr Cook on 29 January.52 On Iraq, Mr Cook

stated that:

“… we were at stalemate, and the situation was deteriorating … We had to find

a means of sustaining our policy on WMD, but in a way that had a degree of

international support and would be adhered to in the region … A more focused form

of sanctions was needed.”

88.  Mr Cook said that he would discuss Iraq with Mr Colin Powell, the new US Secretary

of State, during his forthcoming visit to Washington.

89.  Sir Jeremy responded that the UK should try to get the US to focus on stopping oil

smuggling from Iraq. Mr Cook agreed.

90.  Mr Cook visited Washington from 5 to 7 February.

91.  In a briefing telegram for the visit, officials at the British Embassy Washington

advised that the new US Administration believed the current position on Iraq was

“unsustainable”.53 It wanted a “new approach to more effective containment which can

be sold in the region as enlightened and at home as tougher”.

92.  The Embassy also advised that Iraq had been “at the top of [Secretary] Powell’s

pile”; the State Department, Department of Defense and the White House had been

working intensively to put up advice on policy options.54 Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the

US Defense Secretary, and his Deputy, Mr Paul Wolfowitz, would incline towards more

vigorous action to topple Saddam Hussein.

52  Letter FCO [junior official] to Pattison, 29 January 2001, ‘UN Issues: Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s Call on

the Secretary of State: 29 January’.

53  Telegram 115 Washington to FCO London, 2 February 2001, ‘Your Visit to Washington: Key Issues’.

54  Telegram 117 Washington to FCO London, 1 February 2001, ‘Your Visit to Washington: Iraq’.

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