The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
765.
Mr Dinham,
who attended the DOP(I) meeting, reported to DFID colleagues
that
Mr Benn
had said that he would be urging the UN to use unspent donor funds
to meet
the UNHCR
appeal.444
Mr Browne
had favoured pressing the Iraqi Government to
contribute
to the UNHCR appeal; this was a problem for which the Iraqi
Government
was
responsible and there was no shortage of Iraqi money.
766.
The 11 January
report from the British Embassy Baghdad was passed to
Mr Blair
on 12
January.445
A No.10
official commented on the report: “We are encouraging
the
GoI [Iraqi
Government] to get its act together, given that these are its
citizens.”
767.
Mr Benn
wrote to Mr Blair on 24 January, providing an update on the
humanitarian
situation
in Iraq:
“Displacement
is causing a de facto geographical separation along sectarian
lines,
as
different ethnic groups move to areas in which they will be the
majority.
“There is
clearly a strong political dynamic to the situation and it is
essential
that we
address both the cause and the symptoms … We should press the
Iraqi
Government
to address displacement issues as part of reconciliation, and to
do
more itself
to provide basic services to meet humanitarian needs. The picture
is
unpalatable
for the Iraqi government … and indeed for the coalition (hence
the
largely
silent nature of the humanitarian crisis so far) …
“It is
clear that while not letting the Iraqi Government off the hook, we
must also
continue to
respond to humanitarian needs in Iraq …” 446
768.
Mr Benn
advised that he had therefore decided to contribute £4m to
the
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
769.
On 23
February, a No.10 official advised Mr Blair that there had
been little
improvement
in the humanitarian situation, and that the Iraqi Government
remained
“largely
silent” on the issue.447
The Iraqi
Ministry of Displacement and Migration was
trying to
help but it had little capacity to respond; its budget was
“woefully inadequate”.
Meanwhile,
the international community was stepping up its response. DFID
continued
to look at
ways of unlocking unspent donor funding.
770.
The 8 March
meeting of DOP(I) returned to the issue of the humanitarian
situation
444
Email
Dinham to DFID [junior official], 11 January 2007,
‘DOP(I)’.
445
Minute
Banner to Blair, 12 January 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 12 December
[sic]’.
446
Letter Benn
to Blair, 24 January 2007, [untitled].
447
Minute
Fletcher to Prime Minister, 23 February 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 23
February’ attaching Paper DFID,
22 February
2007, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction Update’.
448
Minutes, 8
March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
320