12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
477.
The Iraq
Senior Officials Group met on 23 September and stated that the
FCO
was sifting
applications and hoped to supply 80 trainers for the Jordan school
and 20 for
training in
az‑Zubayr; no timelines for deployment were
provided.421
478.
At an Iraq
Policing Meeting on 24 October, it was agreed that FCO officials
should
advise Mr
Straw to ask Mr Blunkett to authorise the deployment of police to
Iraq.422
479.
By 18
November, CC Kernaghan noted that the deployment to Basra had still
“not
yet been
formally requested” and was “subject to an appropriate security
assessment”.423
480.
Mr Straw
visited Iraq in late November and met DCC White. In his statement
to the
Inquiry,
Former ACC White said:
“I was
shocked when he [Mr Straw] told me that he was being told
that; there
were no
delays in getting police out to Basra (in fact none had arrived
since my
advance
party came to the place in July, despite requests and reports);
that there
was no
sleeping accommodation for UK police in CPA South (as there were
many
Portakabins
available such as the one I lived in); and that the police academy
was
not ready
(as it had been open and functioning since mid October and all I
needed
were some
more police to help us open and use the many other empty
classrooms).
This final
point was frustrating to hear, because to my memory only one
person
(a military
officer attached to an FCO Iraq unit) had visited it and, in what
was a
classic
‘Catch 22’ situation, it appeared that (in UK) some were saying it
was not
open to
justify not deploying trainers – yet the reason why it was not open
was
because no
trainers were deployed to it.”424
481.
Following his
visit, Mr Straw wrote to Mr John Sawers, Political
Director in the
FCO, the
next day saying:
“I would be
grateful if you would personally grip this issue and ensure that
the
key action
points arising from CC Kernaghan’s report of his Iraq trip are
dealt with
as soon as
possible. A combination of the Byzantine bureaucracy of ACPO
and
a lack of
understanding in the FCO about police issues and practice …
threaten
further
delays and a sub‑optimal delivery in an area where the UK has a
serious
contribution
to make.”425
482.
On the same
day, Mr Straw told the AHMGIR that the “UK contribution to
policing
was
inadequate” and that he would be writing to Mr Blunkett to
encourage more police
forces to
release personnel.426
421
Minute, 25
September 2003, ‘Iraq Senior Officials Group meeting [23
September]’.
422
Minutes
Hayward, 24 October 2003, ‘Iraq Policing Meeting – 24 Oct
03’.
423
Report
Kernaghan to Straw, 18 November 2003, ‘Report on Second Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan –
11/11/03‑14/11/03’.
424
Statement,
20 June 2010, page 35.
425
Minute
Straw to Sawers, 27 November 2003, ‘UK Police Assistance to
Iraq’.
426
Minutes, 27
November 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
161