The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
662.
A Royal Marine
Commando Group deployed with the Amphibious Response
Group
offered “a
high readiness, flexible small scale
land contribution” which
presented
“an
opportunity for ‘boots on the ground’ if the UK decision [was] not
to commit beyond
Package
2”.
663.
The SPG
identified the land element of Package 3 as on “the critical path
for both
UK and US
planning”. It was clear from contacts with the US that there
was:
“… an
expectation of UK ground force commitment, and although there is a
genuine
willingness
to facilitate our being there, this is not without
limit.”
664.
The section
headed “Conflict vs Post‑conflict” asked whether, if UK forces
were
to
participate in the military campaign, “our effort should be against
the need to meet
US
short‑term planning for combat, or the equally demanding and
pressing need for
preparations
for the post‑conflict phase”. It continued:
“Conflict
phase. Commitment to this phase may carry with it inherent risks
with
regard to
post‑conflict engagement with little choice on role, timing,
location, or
future
extraction. An alternative approach that offers a UK lead, or UK
participation
in the
post‑conflict phase may be equally attractive to the US as our
commitment
to a
land role in the conflict phase.
“Post‑Conflict.
Given the wide range of possible post‑conflict scenarios these
forces
would have
to be combat capable forces at high readiness, and in all
probability
with key
elements forward deployed during the conflict phase. The length
and
scale of
our post‑conflict commitment will determine our ability to fulfil a
range of
other
operations, and most notable our Balkan commitment. An enduring
medium
scale
commitment in Iraq would preclude continued medium scale engagement
in
the Balkans.
“Strategic
Balance. We are currently committed to two medium scale land
operations
(FRESCO and
the Balkans), and a land commitment to Iraq at anything above
small
scale will
commit us to three
medium scale land
operations. Although with a full
Package 3
commitment to the conflict phase we retain the SLE [Spearhead
Land
Element],
our ability to deploy and sustain even a small scale force package
has
yet to be
determined, and anything above this Scale of Effort will be
impossible …
Recovery
and recuperation will also be key to our judgements as to which
phase
to commit
to. Hard and fast judgements are not possible, however, commitment
of
Package 3
will have an effect for at least two years.”
“Assuming
that UK land participation is a requirement, there is a
judgement
to be made
on whether we should be engaged in the conflict or
post‑conflict
phases. Both
would be difficult to sustain.”
274