The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

A PPV FOR AFGHANISTAN

294.  In June 2004, a decision was taken that the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ

(ARRC), a UK‑led NATO asset, should deploy to Afghanistan in 2006, rather than

Iraq (see Section 9.2). By October, that decision had become an important factor

in considering resources for Iraq.

295.  On 15 October, the strategy for delivering Project DUCKBOARD was produced.149

296.  A total of 371 “desertised” Snatch 1.5 vehicles had been delivered to support

operations in Iraq: 308 were in operation and 63 were held in reserve. An additional

70 Snatch 2 vehicles would be available from December 2004, also for the reserve,

to replace the 1.5 variants as their capability deteriorated. More than 20 vehicles on

Op TELIC had already been damaged beyond repair.

297.  The strategy identified that a requirement for protected mobility still had to be

defined and that there were a number of “challenges”, including:

• “If Defence has to support; current NI commitments; a continuance of Op TELIC

on current scales; and a medium scale operation in Afghanistan simultaneously

in 2006, a new acquisition of Protected Mobility vehicles, currently unfunded …

will be necessary.”

• Production would need to start in April 2005 to meet the “ready to train date” for

deployment to Afghanistan.

• Regardless of concurrent operations in 2006, “urgent EP/UOR action” was

needed to meet “USURs arising from Operation TELIC and to sustain the

Snatch fleet”.

• There was “no overarching doctrine, no endorsed CONOPS nor definitive

scaling for the provision of Protected Mobility for expeditionary operations”.

• The “lack of definition of the numbers and types of vehicles required” continued

to “stall the acquisition process”.

298.  The strategy recommended requirements should be taken forward as three

separate projects, “within an overarching scrutiny mechanism”, so that each strand could

be delivered independently and at its own pace:

• Type A project (“Snatch 2”) – continuing the conversion of existing Snatch

vehicles for operations in UK and Iraq (the first tranche already under way as an

Operational Emergency);

• Type B project (“Vector”) – producing this capability would depend on

Afghanistan and Iraq concurrency assumptions “and or direction as to required

protection levels”; and

149  Minute MOD [junior officer] to D Jt Cap (AD Jt Mvre), 15 October 2004, ‘Strategy for Delivery of

Protected Patrol and Combat Support Mobility – Project DUCKBOARD’.

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