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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
222.  Lord Turnbull told the Inquiry that the role of COBR(R) was “to take the fallout from
that War Cabinet meeting and try and take things forward”.130
Creation of the Iraq Planning Unit
223.  The inter-departmental (FCO/MOD/DFID) Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), based in
the FCO, was established on 10 February to improve Whitehall co-ordination on
post‑conflict issues.
224.  Although the IPU was an inter-departmental unit, its head was a senior member of
the Diplomatic Service and it was integrated into the FCO management structure.
225.  The draft terms of reference stated that:
The IPU would report to Mr Chaplin in the FCO, but without defining the
relationship between the Unit and senior officials in DFID and the MOD.
The IPU would work “within broad policy guidelines set by the Cabinet Office”.
Its main purpose would be to provide “policy guidance on practical questions”
that UK civilian officials and military commanders would face in Iraq.
The IPU was intended “to bring influence to bear on US plans”.
226.  Tasks assigned to the IPU by the AHGI included consideration of:
the shape of the Iraqi political process needed to underpin the transition to
Iraqi rule;
management of Iraq’s oil; and
whether and where the UK should run its own sector before the restoration of
Iraqi sovereignty.
227.  After the creation of the IPU, the AHGI remained responsible for co-ordination of all
post-conflict planning and preparation across government, including consular planning
and civil contingencies.
228.  On 3 February, Mr Ehrman reported to Mr Ricketts that the Pigott Group had
decided that there was a need for a senior FCO official to co-ordinate full-time with
MOD, DFID and others the rapidly increasing volume of work on aftermath planning.131
229.  Mr Ehrman suggested that “in addition to work on overall legality … we will need
sub-groups on WMD, OFF [the Oil-for-Food programme], SSR [Security Sector Reform],
humanitarian, reconstruction, judicial, possibly terrorism. All this to feed into and
influence the various aftermath groups in Washington.”
130  Public hearing, 13 January 2010, pages 43-44.
131  Minute Ehrman to Ricketts, 3 February 2003, ‘Pigott Group, 3 February’.
302
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