6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
Opposition
groups outside Iraq had “zero credibility” in Iraq.
•
The focus
should be on building local councils (many Iraqis were
localists
at heart).
•
A strong
sense of Iraqi nationalism would hold the country
together.
•
There had
been a shift of wealth from urban to rural and a rebirth of
Iraqi
agriculture.
•
Reintegration
into the global economy would throw up serious
problems,
including
claims and debt.
•
The Sunni
majority [sic] would continue to dominate Iraq’s government.
There
was scope
for greater co-operation between Sunni, Shia and Kurds. An
Iraqi
Islamist
movement could emerge and should perhaps be
encouraged.
•
Many Iraqis
were relatively well disposed to the UK.
793.
Dr Dodge
told The
Independent on Sunday in 2015: “We
were heavily briefed …
They said,
‘Don’t tell him [Mr Blair] not to do it. He has already made up his
mind’.”391
794.
Professor
Clarke, also speaking in 2015, explained that he was “agnostic”
that day
about what
might happen after an invasion. He added: “Blair knew this was
going to be
serious …
He was not blasé about it at all.”
795.
The last
two editions of the SPG paper on UK military strategic thinking
were
emphatic
about the strategic importance of the post-conflict phase of
operations
and the
need for better co-ordination of planning and preparation
across
government.
796.
On 6
November, the SPG advised:
•
The
post-conflict phase of operations had “the potential to prove the
most
protracted
and costly phase of all”.
•
Planning
needed to be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range
of
possible
outcomes.
•
Poor
handling of post-conflict Iraq had the potential to fuel
international
tension and
arm the forces of extremism.
•
Planning
for the post-conflict phase “must be complete before the start
of
offensive
operations”.
797.
The paper
highlighted the need for greater cross-Whitehall co-operation
and
deeper
analysis of the nature of the Iraqi administration.
798.
There is no
indication of any response to the paper.
391
The
Independent on Sunday, 25
January 2015, What the
six wise men told Tony Blair.
247