4.4 | The
search for WMD
not
intended as drafting proposals. I am also aware that the precise
drafting of
items which
comprise potential intelligence must take account of the need not
to
undermine
lines of continuing operational investigation.”
718.
Mr Scarlett
sent a copy to Mr Rycroft, explaining that it:
“… does no
more than draw his [Mr Duelfer’s] attention to items already
written up
by Kay in
classified form, in September. But I have made it clear I was not
trying to
do his
drafting for him.”403
719.
In his memoir,
Mr Duelfer described the relationship with
Mr Scarlett:
“I met …
John Scarlett … and stayed in touch with him and his office
throughout the
process …
He wanted to be certain that the ISG had access to the same data
that
the United
Kingdom had …
“I valued
the direct involvement of Scarlett. Some questioned his suggestions
for
ISG. I
found it helpful to hear and evaluate his ideas.”404
720.
Mr Duelfer
also wrote:
“Scarlett
and I had spoken in person in London and I had requested that he
bring
to my
attention any aspects that I might have overlooked. The particular
points
he recalled
from the earlier Kay Report had been further investigated since
their
publication
and found to be without consequence. The nuggets were fool’s
gold,
but I
was reassured to have examined them.”
721.
Mr Blair
raised the ISG during a video conference with President
Bush
722.
Mr Blair
said that Mr Duelfer must remain in charge of production of
the next
report, but
it was vital that it was handled better than the last. There was a
better story
to be told.
Much material in October’s secret Interim Report could be drawn on
publicly
next time,
such as transcripts of interviews with scientists. By including
detailed material,
the next
report should lead people to the conclusion that “something” was
going on in
Iraq in
breach of UN resolutions, even if the material did not lead to
concrete evidence of
actual
weapons. The next step, probably in a further report, would be to
set out exactly
what had
been happening.
723.
Mr Rycroft
described the conversation as “A good exchange.”
724.
On
11 March, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Mr Blair a note from
Mr Scarlett on
the
progress of his discussions with Mr Duelfer.406
Sir Nigel
informed Mr Blair that
403
Minute
(handwritten) Scarlett to Rycroft, 8 March 2004,
‘ISG’.
404
Duelfer
C. Hide &
Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public
Affairs, 2009.
405
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 9 March 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group: Prime
Minister’s Conversation with
President
Bush, 9 March’.
406
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald to Prime Minister on Minute Scarlett to
Sheinwald, 11 March 2004, ‘ISG’.
565