12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

1433.  On the 14th Division, the JIC judged:

“The replacement of an Iraqi Army brigade in Basra with the new 14th Army Division

(still 50 percent undermanned) and the deployment of an NP [National Police]

battalion and a mechanised infantry unit have raised the ISF profile in Basra from

30,000 in June to 33,500 in December. MNF expect ISF to reach a full strength

of 36,500 in June 2008. Largely manned from outside Basra, these forces are

probably less influenced by local tribal and political ties or militia infiltration than

those recruited locally. The vast majority of JAM continues to observe a cease‑fire

with MNF in Basra and have not challenged ISF for local control – although […] they

think they could successfully do so.”

1434.  On 8 January 2008, AM Peach told the Chiefs of Staff that Gen Mohan had

created a “security equilibrium” in Basra, using a “carrot and stick” approach, but that

recent concessions and reassurances by him to JAM “demonstrated the precarious

nature of the balance of power in Basra”.1310

1435.  Gen Mohan visited the UK in January.1311 He gave an “upbeat” description of

security, stating that it was up to the British if they wanted to leave but that he needed to

be left with “real military capability” to outface JAM and Iranian‑backed militias. He asked

for UK assistance in building intelligence capabilities.

1436.  IDF attacks on UK forces at Basra Air Station began to rise again in 2008 (see

Section 9.6). On 21 February, Major General Barney White‑Spunner, who had just

succeeded Maj Gen Binns as GOC MND(SE), commented:

“General Mohan is fully aware (as are we) that his ability to further strengthen

his control of Basra City is limited as the ISF cannot match JAM in their urban

heartlands, though he is deploying 14th Division into the city as soon as he can.

Our efforts to develop the ISF capability to interdict smuggling of lethal aid as well

as strenuous efforts to develop their urban warfare skills may enable Mohan to have

the desired effect in the future, but for now there is not very much he can do.”1312

1437.  In his evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen White‑Spunner recalled that the first

“increasingly obvious” point on his arrival was that:

“… we needed to redirect our training of the ISF and we needed to … dedicate more

of a mission to … develop 14 Division.”1313

1438.  Lt Gen White‑Spunner said that Gen Mohan had asked for “offensive support”:

“By this we mean those weapons systems … which support infantry rather than

being infantry themselves, particularly the ability to target air and helicopters,

intelligence and surveillance assistance, assistance with command and control

and logistics.”

1310  Minutes, 8 January 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

1311  Minute Binns to CJO, 24 January 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 24 January 2008’.

1312  Minute White‑Spunner to CJO, 21 February 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 21 February 2008’.

1313  Public hearing, 7 January 2010, pages 5‑6.

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