The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
671.
Ms Short also
recorded that she had subsequently spoken to both
Mr Brown
and
Mr Blair. She had told Mr Brown, who “kept on about
French” that he should
speak to
Mr Annan. In response to a request for her view on announcing
a UN lead on
reconstruction
in the Azores, she told Mr Blair that if war was inevitable
that was all he
had got.
Mr Blair had said he would “still be open to other
possibilities”.
672.
The FCO
suggested that Mr Blair should talk to Mr Annan from the
Azores with key
messages
including:
•
Exploring
the scope for any remaining diplomacy (if relevant), including
the
possibility
of a final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein as the last window for
a
peaceful
solution.
•
Discouraging
any further visits to Baghdad (as suggested by Iraq – see
Box
below),
“whose only purpose would be to buy more time”.
•
Looking
forward to the UN having “a significant role after any conflict in
helping
Iraq move
quickly towards new prosperity and stability”.
•
Hoping that
Mr Annan could “work to improve the atmosphere in the
Council
and keeping
the UN steady”.230
Iraq also
sought to deflect military action.
Dr Blix
wrote that a letter from Dr al-Sa’adi, Scientific Adviser to
the Iraq Presidency
who
represented Iraq in its negotiations with the UN, inviting
Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei to
visit
Baghdad to try to accelerate the inspections process and take note
of the progress
achieved,
was received on 15 March.231
Dr Blix
and Dr ElBaradei had earlier concluded that any visit would
need to be
preceded by
a declaration from Saddam Hussein and that they would come
to
discuss its
implementation. Dr Blix informed Mr Annan, Ambassador
Negroponte and
Sir Jeremy Greenstock.
Dr Blix
wrote that:
•
Sir Jeremy
responded quickly; the UK Foreign Office urged caution. The bars
for
a visit
should be set high with the need not only for a declaration but
also some
“down payment”.
•
Ambassador
Negroponte “discouraged” a visit.
•
Mr Annan
advised that Dr al-Sa’adi should be asked to clarify more
precisely what he
thought
could be attained; and that the President of the Council should be
informed.
On 16
March, Saddam Hussein was reported to have said that Iraq used to
have weapons
of mass
destruction to defend itself against Iran and Israel, and that when
he (Saddam)
said he had
no weapons “he means what he says”.232
230
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 15 March 2003, ‘Azores Summit’.
231
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2005.
232
The
Independent, 17 March
2003, Saddam
acknowledges Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.
516