15.2 |
Conclusions: Civilian personnel
51.
In July 2003,
Mr Peter Collecott, FCO Director General Corporate
Affairs,
commented
on the tension between achieving UK objectives in Iraq and duty of
care
to staff.
He advised Mr Straw:
“We will
inevitably be faced with some very difficult prioritisation
decisions:
activity v. security
in Iraq; activity in Iraq v. priorities elsewhere.”19
52.
Concerns
increased after the attacks on the UN headquarters in Baghdad
in
August 2003.
53.
Mr Crompton
advised Mr Straw:
“Resources
for security assets are an issue. But the principle should be that
we
provide the
number of security assets we need for people to do their jobs
properly,
rather than
limit the number of tasks we take on to the number of security
assets
we have on
the ground (as some around Whitehall have been suggesting). This
will
54.
Over time, the
tasks that UK civilians were able to carry out in Iraq
became
increasingly
limited. In June 2006, the IPU characterised the FCO approach to
security
as “risk
averse”.21
It stated
that, where officials judged that a particular task
exposed
personnel
to greater risk than the mitigating measures in place to deal with
that risk, the
task would
not be undertaken.
55.
The withdrawal
of the majority of civilian staff from the Basra Palace site to
Basra Air
Station and
Kuwait in response to a rapid deterioration in security in late
2006 followed
that
pattern.
56.
Sir Peter
Ricketts told the Inquiry that he was clear that the British
Embassy Office
would have
to leave Basra Palace once it was known that the UK military would
be
moving
out.
57.
Officials
reported in December 2006 that the rapid withdrawal had raised
concerns
among the
UK’s partners about its commitment to civilian
operations.
58.
The Government
did not assess to what extent civilians could be effective in
a
highly
insecure environment. Nor did the principal government departments
concerned
reach
agreement on a cross-government framework for managing risk in
such
circumstances.
59.
By late 2006,
UK civilian activity in Iraq, particularly in Basra and the South,
had
become
severely constrained by the security situation. Only after the
change in the
security
environment brought about by the Charge of the Knights, the Iraqi
military
19
Minute
Collecott, 11 July 2003, on Minute Millett to PS [FCO], 11 July
2003, ‘Iraq: Security’.
20
Minute
Crompton to PS [FCO], 28 August 2003, ‘Ad Hoc
Ministerial’.
21
Minute IPU
[junior official] to PS/PUS [FCO], 30 June 2006, ‘Iraq: Review of
Security’ attaching Paper
Iraq Policy
Unit, June 2006, ‘Review of Security of Staff and Missions in
Iraq’.
419