The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
537.
The policy
considerations included:
•
the degree
to which the UK wanted to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the US
–
“a
fundamental political judgement … where are the UK’s red lines?”;
and
•
the UK’s
attitude to the future of Iraq. “Does the UK wish to become
intimately
involved in
reconstruction and civil administration? This is not a military
task …
but it will
both affect and be affected by the level of military engagement. It
will
also have
significant resource implications, across government.”
538.
The briefing
concluded with a section on the worst case scenario:
“Much of
the above is predicated on best-case assumptions for the progress
of a
conflict
(swift, short and successful), the condition of Iraq post-conflict
(infrastructure
not greatly
damaged by fighting, limited internecine conflict) and the degree
of
international
buy-in with civil and military resources, including cash
(considerable
and UN
endorsed). The Secretary of State may wish to take the opportunity
of this
meeting to
remind his colleagues that there is at least a credible possibility
that none
of these
conditions will obtain.
“Even if
there is a second (and possibly third) UNSCR this is no guarantee
of
broad-based
international buy-in into Phase IV … [T]here is a real possibility
of
the UK
(along with the US and a few forward leaning smaller military
nations)
being
committed to Phase IV engagement without international burden
sharing
and without
an immediate exit strategy. At its worst this could expose the UK
to
an
enduring
large scale military commitment (20-30,000 in theatre) –
and
the
commensurate
civil support required to contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq …
The
potential
consequences are severe … This is not the most likely risk, but it
is one
that
increases the further the outcome post-conflict is from a
UN-mandated solution.”
539.
In the
speaking note for Mr Hoon attached to the brief, officials
highlighted
concerns
about the tendency of discussion of the post-conflict phase, and
the IPU
annotated
agenda, to focus on the military contribution:
“A military
presence will be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
success
in
Iraq. A large,
organised and properly funded humanitarian assistance
plan
(supported by
DFID) is needed from the outset.”
540.
Mr Nicholas
Cannon, Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary for Foreign
Affairs,
briefed Mr
Blair that Ministers needed to make progress on three interlinked
issues:
the
humanitarian response; the UN mandate; and whether the UK should
take on a
geographical
sector in Iraq.175
Basra was
“the obvious choice” if the UK decided to take
on one of
seven geographical sectors in Iraq.
175
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 5 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict
Issues’.
470