The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
detention
ops targeting IPS and N Basra leadership”. Maj Gen Cooper
reported that a
total of
three IPS officers had been detained within Op CORRODE since
17 May 2006.
1029.
The JIC’s
Assessment of 9 June described the disbanding of the DIA as
“remedial
action”
resulting from “MNF pressure”.947
However,
the JIC stated that “the personnel
have been
reassigned rather than sacked”.
1030.
This JIC
Assessment considered whether the ISF was “fit for duty”. It
reported:
“The ISF in
the South reflect the deep‑rooted local tribal and political
influences.
The Army’s
10th Division in MND(SE) is rated by the MNF as increasingly
effective.
It has
performed basic tasks such as patrols and static guard duties
successfully,
but remains
untested in counter‑insurgency operations without MNF support.
The
Police in
the South are a cause for much greater concern. Many local Police
officers,
in Basra
and Maysan in particular, remain loyal to their political faction
or militia
rather than
to formal command structures. Both Badr and JAM retain support
among
the ISF in
different parts of the South. We judge that these divided loyalties
would
affect the
ability and willingness of the Police to cope in the event of an
intensified
campaign of
violence by Shia militias against the MNF, or fighting between
Shia
factions …
Baghdad’s central institutions have been unable to exert any
control over
the police
in Basra.”
On 9 June
2006, a JIC Assessment stated that, by 1 May, 800 Navy personnel
had been
“trained
and equipped”, increasing from 750 on 4 October
2005.948
In
September, the Iraqi Navy transferred to Iraqi control, under the
command and control
of the
Joint Headquarters.949
In
November, the Private Secretary to Mr Des Browne, Defence
Secretary from May 2006,
briefed
No.10 officials that progress on the Iraqi Navy had “lost early
momentum due
to failure
of the Iraqi procurement process” but stated that contracts had
recently been
awarded and
that the Iraqi Navy had plans to fund and build critical
infrastructure during
2007.950
He
concluded: “this momentum must be sustained”.
On 6
September, an Independent Commission reported to Congress its
conclusion that:
“The Iraqi
Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its
mission.
However, it
is making substantive progress in this early stage of development:
it has
a
well‑thought‑out growth plan, which it is successfully executing.
Its maturation is
hampered by
the [Iraqi] Ministry of Defence’s understandable focus on ground
forces
and
counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic
inefficiency. The Iraqi
947
JIC
Assessment, 9 June 2006, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Fit for
Duty?’.
948
JIC
Assessment, 9 June 2006, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Fit for
Duty?’.
949
JIC
Assessment, 17 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Prospects in
2007’.
950
Letter
McNeil to Banner, 9 November 2006 attaching Minute DJC, 9 November
2006, ‘Strengthening
the Iraqi
Military Forces’.
290