12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1377.
At Cabinet on
3 May, Mr Browne stated:
“In Basra
and the South‑East, there were encouraging signs of progress. The
Iraqi
Army
division … was becoming, by any measure, very effective. Its
performance
and
training had impressed the Americans when it was operating in
Baghdad …
In Basra we
had now handed over to the Iraqis two bases in the City and
one
outside
without incident, a significant contrast with the disorder that had
taken
place over
earlier base handovers … The Iraqi security infrastructure did not
work
well and
its leadership, including the Provincial Chief of Police and
Emergency
Security
Committee, was ineffective and incapable of providing the direction
needed
by
those in the police forces capable of working effectively
(estimated as some
1378.
On 2 May,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald met ACM Stirrup to discuss whether there
was
“continuing
military utility” in the UK’s mission in Iraq.1264
ACM Stirrup
said that he saw
that
resting on the continuing need to train the Iraqi 10th Division,
anti‑JAM operations
and a
capacity to re‑intervene. Sir Nigel reported the meeting to
Mr Blair and highlighted
that ACM
Stirrup had not mentioned the IPS, making the observation: “I think
the MOD
now regard
them as a busted flush.”
1379.
On 25 May, a
planned ISOF operation in Basra resulted in the death of the
Basra
JAM leader
Mr Wissam Abu Qadir.1265
Maj Gen Shaw
described the operation as a
success but
reported:
“The
performance of the ISF was less convincing. Not surprisingly that
the IPS
failed to
stand and defend the PJCC, but more disappointing that the Iraqi
Army was
returned to
barracks (following another JAM capture and humiliating release of
two
IA vehicles
and crew) whilst JAM was on the streets. The order to remain in
barracks
was given
by Gen Ali Hamadi (Chair of the Emergency Security Committee).
His
reasons are
not clear, although Gen Habib [the new commander of 10th
Division]
claims that
it was a direct order from PM Maliki. It may well be true that last
Friday
night was
not the right time for 10th Division to stand and fight JAM toe to
toe and
that the
call was a good one. It may equally be true that Gen Ali
ordered them back
into
barracks as a face saving measure, fearing that 1 Bde (who are
Basrawis)
would
refuse to soldier, or that JAM had pressurised him into withdrawing
them, to
give them a
clear shot at us. Gen Habib is, however, acutely aware of the
issues
within his
own Division and the need to address them. He needs to be given
the
opportunity
to solve the problems … in an Iraqi way … But as hinted at above,
this
‘Iraqi way’
may prove in time to be a ‘non‑aggression’ pact between the IA and
JAM.”
1263
Cabinet
Conclusions, 3 May 2007.
1264
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.
1265
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 31 May 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 31
May 2007’.
375