The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

52. In his account of discussions on Phase IV the following day, Mr Rycroft recorded

that Mr Blair had identified the main issue as whether the UN formed the future Iraqi

Government or whether the Coalition did so with UN endorsement, but had said that

“it was not helpful to expose this distinction yet”.25

53. Mr Rycroft recorded that the US and UK would “play this negotiation long”,

until after the conflict, when they would be “in a stronger position to ensure the right

arrangements”.

54. After returning to the UK, Mr Blair told members of the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq that

in relation to the post-conflict administration of Iraq:

“He intended to calm down the debate and engage in subterranean diplomacy so

that we reached the right outcome.”26

55. Mr Blair also said:

“A new United Nations Security Council resolution would be required. The tactics to

achieve that was through quiet and effective diplomacy.”

56. FCO Legal Advisers were asked to give rapid consideration on 28 March to the

draft text of a ‘Freedom Message’ and ‘Proclamation’ addressed to Iraqi citizens which it

was intended that General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief US Central Command

(CENTCOM), would issue.

57. In his advice to Mr Chilcott, Mr Llewellyn observed that if General Franks were to

speak on behalf of the Coalition, “we should be given a full opportunity to comment on

its content in detail”.27

58. On the content of the draft, Mr Llewellyn advised that “there are a number of

elements in it which raise concerns regarding their compatibility with the authority of an

Occupying Power”. Specifically:

• the length of Occupation should be based on time taken for WMD disarmament,

not the creation of a representative government;

• references to free elections went beyond the remit of an Occupying Power;

• the phrase “powers of government” implied that the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) described in the message had more than the temporary

administrative powers of an occupying force;

• requiring Iraqis to provide information on the conflict with Iran was outside the

lawful basis for Occupation; and

25 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 27 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with President Bush at Camp

David: Iraq Phase IV’.

26 Minutes, 28 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.

27 Minute Llewellyn to Chilcott, 28 March 2003, ‘Proposed US ‘Freedom Message’ to the People of Iraq’.

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