The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraqi
Government but they had failed. UK forces had continued to confront
those who
used
violence and to interdict, where possible, operations to smuggle
weapons.
1006.
Prime Minister
Maliki expressed surprise at the amount and variety of
weapons
in JAM’s
possession. Mr Prentice explained that “Iran alone” was
responsible for the
weapons in
JAM’s hands. It was not possible to stem the flow of smuggled
weapons
either to
Basra or to Sadr City completely.
1007.
On the issue
of helicopter support, Mr Prentice explained that both US and
UK
Rules of
Engagement had prevented flights initially but that the US had
altered theirs
and so were
able to conduct selected operations.
1008.
Prime Minister
Maliki concluded by thanking the UK for the support offered.
He
would be
meeting the Minister of Defence on 18 April and would communicate
the true
picture of
UK co-operation.
1009.
Mr Prentice
told the Inquiry that he had gone over the history of the
UK’s
negotiations
with JAM and the arrangements for releasing detainees with Prime
Minister
Maliki, who
acknowledged that his Office had been informed.494
1010.
A CIG assessed
the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces during the
Charge
of the
Knights in a note issued on 14 April.495
The CIG
judged that:
“… on their
own, the ISF underperformed against JAM in Basra, Maysan and
Dhi
Qar … In
Basra they relied heavily on MNF supplies (i.e. ammunition and
rations),
air strikes
and eventually MNF mentoring … Military reporting suggested little
sign of
a detailed
operational plan or evidence of precision targeting of JAM Special
Groups
… until the
arrival of MNF training teams from 1 April …
“Basra’s
Chief of Police reportedly believes that hundreds of local police
melted
away within
the first 24 hours of fighting – others joined JAM’s ranks … Many
of the
National
Police units drafted in from Baghdad, with superior arms and
armour, fared
much
better. The affiliation of many to ISCI/Badr probably strengthened
their resolve
to try and
weaken their chief rival (JAM).
“… even
with reinforcements … the Iraqi Army lost most tactical
engagements
against JAM
… prior to JAM’s stand down on 31st March. However, neither did
they
cede
ground, and specific successes … [have] emboldened them. Iraqi
Special
Forces were
ineffective until their US mentors were re-inserted.”
1011.
In his weekly
report on 14 April, Lt Gen Cooper wrote that the theme
from
Gen Petraeus’
and Ambassador Crocker’s testimony likely to have the biggest
impact
on the
campaign in the short to medium term was their renewed focus on
addressing
494
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, page 32.
495
CIG Current
Assessment Note, 14 April 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces Performance
in MND(SE)’.
370