The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
523.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that, at the No.10 morning
meeting
on 17 February,
Mr Blair “was keen on a major upgrade of our
communications
and believed
we could win the argument as set out at the
weekend”.142
524.
An
extraordinary meeting of the European Council to discuss Iraq
on
17 February
pledged “full support” to Security Council efforts and to work
with
partners,
“especially the United States”, to disarm Iraq.
525.
Mr Annan
appealed for transatlantic unity and patient persuasive
diplomacy
behind
closed doors. The UN would be seriously weakened if action was
taken
without its
authority.
526.
The discussion
of Foreign Ministers addressed the objective of
disarmament
rather than
regime change, the need for a second resolution whilst the
inspections were
continuing,
the consequences of military action, and the role of the EU, its
relationship
with the US
and its credibility.143
“… what was
at stake was the future of multilateralism in a unipolar world.
France
emphasised
the power of words but not the power of action. Europe was
very
multilateralist
in decision-making but not so when it came to action. There
were
essentially
three fundamental issues involved: Iraq remained a threat to
international
security;
the only reason that inspections were taking place was because of
military
pressure on
Saddam; and Iraq was not complying. The EU would not be having
this
discussion
unless the US and the UK were willing to pay for this military
build up and
put their
troops on the line. They could not stay there forever but that did
not mean
that events
were being driven by a military timetable.”
528.
Mr Annan’s
address to the Council was reported as “uncompromising in
putting
the onus on
Saddam to implement resolution 1441; and to implement it
swiftly”.144
If the
Security Council managed the current crisis successfully, it would
emerge with
its authority
enhanced. But if it failed, and action was taken without its
authority, the UN
would be
seriously weakened. If Iraq were allowed to defy the Security
Council because
the
international community failed to impose itself, the foundations of
collective security
would be
gravely undermined. An effective international security system
depended
on the
Council and on its determination to take action in even the most
difficult cases.
529.
Mr Annan
had appealed for transatlantic unity and patient persuasive
diplomacy
behind
closed doors to build a common front. The greater the degree of
consensus
142
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
143
Telegram
[un-numbered] UKREP Brussels to FCO London, 17 February 2003,
‘Iraq: Special European
Council, 17
February: Foreign Ministers Discussion’.
144
Telegram
178 UKREP Brussels to FCO London, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Special
European Council,
17 February:
Discussion with UNSG Annan’.
274