6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

1062. Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry that during the shift from a northern to a southern

option, he “felt that it was important to reappraise, to pause, to take stock as to what was

going on”.510 He added:

“The planning for post-conflict didn’t seem to me to be very robust. As we could

read it in the United States, a lot had been done, but it didn’t seem to have bite

and direction.”511

1063. On 7 January, the SPG produced a paper analysing the advantages and

disadvantages of a southern option.512

1064. The SPG advised the Chiefs of Staff that US combat power would deliver military

success, but strategic victory would be “successful delivery of aftermath and limiting

unintended consequences”. The paper stated that adopting a southern option had the

potential to:

“Provide UK with leading role in key areas of Iraq (free of Kurdish political risks)

in aftermath, and thus provide leverage in aftermath planning efforts, especially

related to:

– Humanitarian effort.

– Reconstruction of key infrastructure.

– Future control and distribution of Iraqi oil.”

1065. The SPG concluded that adoption of the southern option would mean that the UK

was likely to have a discrete AOR established early, with less demanding command and

control than in the North. In addition:

“UK will have made an early commitment to aftermath that will probably demand a

commitment for a number of years. This would be hard to avoid in any event, and

engagement in South offers significant advantages over possibly being fixed in North

with Kurds.”

1066. The SPG recommended that the Chiefs of Staff should agree Lt Gen Reith’s

recommendation for a force package to be deployed to the South.

1067. The analysis underpinning the SPG’s conclusions did not appear to include

any assessment of the conditions likely to be encountered or the tasks to be

performed in either northern or southern Iraq during Phase IV.

1068. Lt Gen Reith introduced his 6 January paper on the southern option at the Chiefs

of Staff meeting on 8 January.513 He explained that:

510 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 24-25.

511 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 35-36.

512 Paper SPG, 7 January 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Military Strategic Analysis of Pros/Cons of adopting

a Southern Land Force Option’.

513 Minutes, 8 January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

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